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Valuing Life: A Human Rights Perspective
on the Calculus of Regulation
William J. Aceves†
We cannot know why the world suffers. But we can know how
the world decides that suffering shall come to some persons and
not to others. While the world permits sufferers to be chosen,
something beyond their agony is earned, something even
beyond the satisfaction of the world’s needs and desires. For it
is in the choosing that enduring societies preserve or destroy
those values that suffering and necessity expose. In this way
societies are defined, for it is by the values that are foregone no
less than by those that are preserved at tremendous cost that we
know a society’s character.1

Introduction
How much is a human life worth? This is both a puzzling and
subversive question for human rights advocates to consider.
The concept of human rights is premised on the inherent
dignity and equality of all human beings. The Preamble of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights acknowledges that
“recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable
rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of
freedom, justice and peace in the world . . . .”2 To implement these
basic principles, the Universal Declaration provides that “[a]ll
human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights” and
that everyone is entitled to human rights without distinctions of
any kind.3 It then states that “[e]veryone has the right to life,
† William J. Aceves is the Dean Steven R. Smith Professor of Law at California
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Robert Dalton, Jessica Fink, Paul Hoffman, Nancy Kim, Ken Klein, John Noyes,
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Scholars Workshop, and the 2016 Faculty Development Workshop Series at
California Western School of Law. Erin Dimbleby, Elijah Gaglio, Laura Goolsby,
Sahar Karimi, Taiba Munir, and Megan Villamin provided excellent research
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1. GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 17 (1978).
2. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948)
[hereinafter UDHR].
3. Id. arts. 1, 2.
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liberty and the security of person.”4 Similar pronouncements
affirming the right to life and the equality of all human beings
appear in other multilateral and regional human rights
instruments.5
The right to life and the corollary right to be free from the
arbitrary deprivation of life constitute the defining human right.6
Indeed, the “right to life” norm has been characterized “as the
supreme human right, since without effective guarantee of this
right, all other rights of the human being would be devoid of
meaning.”7
This right entails both negative and positive
obligations, which means that states are prohibited from taking life
and they must also undertake affirmative steps to protect life.8 The
positive obligations associated with the right to life are significant
because they expand the breadth of protection and the depth of the
state’s obligations.9 The primacy of the right to life norm is
evidenced by its universality and its non-derogable status under
international law.10
4. Id. art. 3.
5. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights references the
“inherent dignity” of all people as well as their “equal and inalienable rights.”
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, pmbl., Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. Cf. THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN HUMAN
RIGHTS DISCOURSE (David Kretzmer & Eckart Klein eds., 2002) (containing articles
that further expand on the concept of “dignity” in human rights documents and
culture); Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of
Human Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 655 (2008) (discussing the prevalence of the
phrase “dignity” in human rights documents).
6. MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR
COMMENTARY 121 (2d rev. ed. 2005).
7. See id.; see also Yoram Dinstein, The Right to Life, Physical Integrity, and
Liberty, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 114, 114 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981)
(“The right to life is incontestably the most important of all human rights. Civilized
society cannot exist without legal protection of human life. The inviolability or
sanctity of life is, perhaps, the most basic value of modern civilization. In the final
analysis, if there were no right to life, there would be no point in the other human
rights.”); Stefan Trechsel, Spotlights on Article 2 ECHR, The Right to Life, in
DEVELOPMENT AND DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN LAW 671, 674
(Wolfgang Benedek et al. eds., 1999) (“[O]nce life is lost, what does there remain to
protect?”).
8. See NOWAK, supra note 6, at 122 (“Although some States, including the US,
sought to structure the right to life exclusively as a claim to forbearance by the State,
the majority of delegates in the HRComm representing a variety of legal systems
spoke out in favor of obligating States parties to protect life on the horizontal level
as well.”).
9. Id. at 123. Positive obligations “extended the scope of protection to include
other threats to human life, such as malnutrition, life-threatening illness, nuclear
energy or armed conflict.” Id.
10. U.N. Human Rights Comm., Gen. Comment 6, Art. 6, Right to Life (Sixteenth
session, 1982), U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, ¶ 1, at 6 (1994) (“[The right to life] is the
supreme right from which no derogation is permitted even in time of public
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To place a price on the value of a human life is, thus, unsettling
to human rights advocates. In fact, it seems inconsistent with core
human rights principles that treat human life as sacrosanct and all
human beings as equal. In absolute terms, it implies that human
life is fungible, and a commodity that can be bought, traded, and
sold. In relative terms, it implies the value of human life may vary
and some lives may be more valuable than others. And yet,
valuation of human life occurs frequently.11
Throughout the world, governments use cost-benefit analysis
to make countless decisions on a variety of issues that implicate
human life.12 Steeped in utilitarian principles, cost-benefit analysis
provides a methodology for decision-making and the allocation of
resources.13 At its most basic level, cost-benefit analysis simply
balances the risks and rewards associated with a particular
decision.14 An essential part of this process is the quantification
emergency which threatens the life of the nation . . . .”); see also U.N. Human Rights
Comm., Gen. Comment 14, Art. 6, Right to Life (Sixteenth session, 1982),
Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendation Adopted by
Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, ¶ 1, at 18 (July 29, 1994)
(explaining the importance of the right to life to the Human Rights Committee in the
ICCPR).
11. ANTHONY BOARDMAN ET AL., COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 408–10 (4th ed. 2010)
(describing several studies that determined the statistical value of a human life).
12. While commonly used, cost-benefit analysis is subject to significant criticism.
See, e.g., MATTHEW D. ADLER, WELL-BEING AND FAIR DISTRIBUTION: BEYOND COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS 92–114 (2012) (explaining that cost-benefit analysis can violate
certain economic principles, and while cost-benefit analysis may comply with other
economic principles, it is not necessarily morally attractive); FRANK ACKERMAN &
LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE
VALUE OF NOTHING 8 (2004) (“The basic problem with narrow economic analysis of
health and environmental protection is that human life, health, and nature cannot
be described meaningfully in monetary terms; they are priceless.”); DOUGLAS A.
KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE 2 (2010) (arguing that a focus on economic
analysis leads to a lack of regard for other important values); Henry S. Richardson,
The Stupidity of the Cost-Benefit Standard, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 971 (2000) (arguing
that cost-benefit analysis is a poor standard because it fails to account for new
information as it comes in).
13. Steven Kelman, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Ethical Critique, 5 REGULATION
33, 33–34 (1981); Alasdair MacIntyre, Utilitarianism and Cost-Benefit Analysis: An
Essay on the Relevance of Moral Philosophy to Bureaucratic Theory, in THE MORAL
DIMENSIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY CHOICE: BEYOND THE MARKET PARADIGM 179, 184
(John Martin Gilroy et al. eds., 1992).
14. BOARDMAN, supra note 11, at 1–2 (describing cost-benefit analysis in simple
terms as weighing the benefits and costs of a proposal); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, VALUING
LIFE: HUMANIZING THE REGULATORY STATE 2 (2014) (giving a simple description of
cost-benefit analysis) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, VALUING LIFE]; HAROLD WINTER,
TRADE-OFFS: AN INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMIC REASONING AND SOCIAL ISSUES 1 (2d
ed. 2012) (describing cost-benefits analysis as considering the tradeoffs associated
with an issue). See generally COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES (Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner eds., 2001)
(containing articles describing issues related to cost-benefit analysis); RISKS, COSTS,
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and monetization of costs and benefits.15 The expression of values
in monetary terms facilitates comparison and decision-making.16
Cost-benefit analysis is valued as a decision-making methodology
because it purports to offer a transparent and objective approach
for the efficient allocation of resources.17
An important component of cost-benefit analysis involves
calculating the value of a statistical life (VSL).18 The VSL is a
discrete number that quantifies the value associated with a
reduction in mortality risks within a distinct population.19 The VSL
is then used to compare the financial costs of a proposed action with
the benefits established by the reduced probability of death.20 Costbenefit analysis is primarily an ex ante analysis, meaning it is used
to make decisions on the proper allocation of resources to reduce or
prevent deaths.21 This approach is in contrast to the ex post
analysis courts use in wrongful death cases.22
LIVES SAVED: GETTING BETTER RESULTS FROM REGULATION (Robert W. Hahn
ed., 1996) (containing articles describing issues related to cost-benefit analysis).
15. BOARDMAN, supra note 11, at 1–2.
16. Id. at 10–15 (describing the basic cost-benefit analysis process after the
monetization step).
17. See Robert W. Hahn, The Economic Analysis of Regulation: A Response to the
Critics, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1021, 1045–46 (2004) (explaining how the use of
“scorecards” can “make the regulatory process more transparent”); William Meadow
& Cass R. Sunstein, Statistics, Not Experts, 51 DUKE L.J. 629, 641 (2001) (arguing it
would be better to use statistical evidence instead of expert testimony in negligence
cases). Cost-benefit analysis is one of several methods for decision making.
CALABRESI & BOBBITT, supra note 1, at 31–49.
18. See generally Mathew D. Adler, Welfarism, Equity, and the Choice Between
Statistical and Identified Victims, in IDENTIFIED VERSUS STATISTICAL LIVES: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE 53, 59–62 (I. Glenn Cohen et al. eds., 2015)
[hereinafter IDENTIFIED VERSUS STATISTICAL LIVES] (describing cost-benefit analysis
and VSL); W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Life in Legal Contexts: Survey and Critique,
2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 195, 196 (2000) (“Economic discussions of the value of life
almost invariably focus on the value of a statistical life, considering an individual
facing a very small probability of death.”).
19. Viscusi, The Value of Life, supra note 18, at 201–208.
20. Id. at 197 (“[T]he value of a statistical life is a prospective measure that in
effect establishes the appropriate price society is willing to pay for small risk
reductions.”). For the origins of the VSL concept, see H. Spencer Banzhaf,
Retrospectives: The Cold-War Origins of the Value of Statistical Life, 28 J. ECON.
PERSP. 213 (2014); see also T. C. Schelling, The Life You Save May Be Your Own, in
PROBLEMS IN PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 127 (Samuel B. Chase, Jr. ed., 1968)
(describing the concept of VSL).
21. BOARDMAN, supra note 11, at 3.
22. See generally Ronen Avraham, Putting a Price on Pain-and-Suffering
Damages: A Critique of the Current Approaches and a Preliminary Proposal for
Change, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 87, 90 (2006) (describing “the way pain and suffering is
currently handled in the United States”); David W. Leebron, Final Moments:
Damages for Pain and Suffering Prior To Death, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 256 (1989)
(discussing pain and suffering damages in the United States).
AND
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Governments use cost-benefit analysis and VSL calculations
to consider a wide range of issues, including environmental
standards, health regulations, transportation rules, and worker
safety protocols.23 This methodology is used to make decisions
regarding acceptable levels of carcinogens in the water supply24 or
pollutants in the air.25 It can even address mortality risks in vehicle
rollover accidents26 or the costs of reducing sexual violence in the
prison system.27 In sum, these decisions can affect every aspect of
human life. They can extend life or end it. They can enhance the
quality of life or degrade it.28
While regulatory decisions using cost-benefit analysis and
VSL calculations implicate millions of lives, the underlying
methodology has not received any meaningful critique regarding its
compliance with human rights law.29 Accordingly, this Article
examines the valuing of life from a human rights perspective.30 It
23. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., FMVSS
216, UPGRADE ROOF CRUSH RESISTANCE, 2 (Aug. 2005) [hereinafter FMVSS 216,
UPGRADE ROOF CRUSH RESISTANCE]; ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 12;
BOARDMAN, supra note 11, at 20 (noting that cost-benefit analysis is used in many
countries); SUNSTEIN, VALUING LIFE, supra note 14, at 3 (describing the regulatory
function of cost-benefit using OIRA as covering “national security, immigration,
energy, environmental protection, occupational safety, food safety, education, and
much more.”).
24. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 12, at 93.
25. Id. at 48 (“EPA promptly rejected these [benzene emissions rules] on the
grounds that they were too expensive, and achieved too little reduction in risk to be
worthwhile.”).
26. See FMVSS 216, UPGRADE ROOF CRUSH RESISTANCE, supra note 23.
27. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION ACT REGULATORY
IMPACT ASSESSMENT (2012).
28. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, VALUING LIFE, supra note 14, at 3–4 (describing
regulatory decisions as having possible positive and negative effects on people and
that regulatory decisions are often made by cost-benefit analysis).
29. This article does not address other human rights norms that are also
implicated by cost-benefit analysis and VSL calculations such as the right to health.
See Matthew M. Kavanagh et al., Evolving Human Rights and the Science of
Antiretroviral Medicine, 17 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. J. 76 (2015); Katharine G. Young,
The Minimum Core of Economic and Social Rights: A Concept in Search of Content,
33 YALE J. INT’L L. 113 (2008).
30. There is a long tradition of interdisciplinary research in the study of
international law. See, e.g., BETH SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS:
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS 9–12 (2009) (describing the growing
bond between international relations and international law); INTERDISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Jeffrey L.
Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds., 2013) (containing articles about international
relations and international law); Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical
Turn in International Legal Scholarship, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (2012) (“There is a
new empirical turn in international legal scholarship. Building on decades of
theoretical work in law and social science, a new generation of empirical studies is
elaborating on how international law works in different contexts.”); Anne-Marie
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does so by reviewing the use of cost-benefit analysis and VSL
calculations in the United States and critiquing their compliance
with the right to life norm under human rights law. Although this
Article examines the U.S. regulatory process, its findings are
generalizable and apply to all governments that use cost-benefit
analysis and VSL calculations in making decisions that affect
mortality rates.31 Part I reviews how federal agencies in the United
States use cost-benefit analysis to make regulatory decisions. It
then offers a brief overview of how VSL calculations are made and
their role in cost-benefit analysis. Part II examines the right to life
norm under human rights law and its establishment of both
negative and positive obligations on states. The right to life norm
now imposes a positive obligation on states to protect against
threats to human life. As a result, states must take legislative and
regulatory action to reduce mortality risks whenever possible.
Finally, Part III considers the implications of the right to life norm
on cost-benefit analysis and VSL calculations. Human rights law
raises both methodological and normative concerns with the use of
this approach to decision-making. Specifically, some decisions
based on cost-benefit analysis and which use VSL calculations may
violate the right to life norm because they undervalue human life.
In fact, efforts to monetize human rights may face insurmountable
challenges because such rights are not easily amenable to
quantification or monetization.
Regulatory decisions implicate the lives of countless people
every day. Mortality risks are real, and people live and die based
on the decisions that governments make. Because these decisions
involve “statistical” or unidentified lives that may be affected in the
future, they do not receive the same level of critical review as
decisions that involve identified lives.32 Moreover, it is easy to
Slaughter, International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda,
87 AM. J. INT’L L. 205 (1993) (discussing international law and international
relations).
31. In fact, the United States encourages other countries to use cost-benefit
analysis in their own regulatory process. See, e.g., Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-210, § 2102(b)(8)(B), 116 Stat. 933, 997 (“The principal negotiating objectives of
the United States regarding the use of government regulation or other practices by
foreign governments to provide a competitive advantage to their domestic producers,
service providers, or investors and thereby reduce market access for United States
goods, services, and investments are . . . to require that proposed regulations be
based on sound science, cost-benefit analysis, risk assessment, or other objective
evidence.”).
32. See THOMAS O. MCGARITY, SIDNEY SHAPIRO & DAVID BOLLIER,
SOPHISTICATED SABOTAGE: THE INTELLECTUAL GAMES USED TO SUBVERT
RESPONSIBLE REGULATION 148 (2004) (describing the current regime as treating
identified lives as having more value than unidentified lives); IDENTIFIED VERSUS
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overlook or discount the lives of unknown people or potential
victims.33 Indeed, this has been a significant issue in discussions
regarding the responsibility of current generations to consider the
rights of future generations.
Effective measures of human rights protection are prima facie
dependent on certain conditions: [w]e need to be able to identify
manifest human rights violations as well as perpetrators and
victims, whether these be individuals or groups. Implied here,
however, is a latent “presentist bias” in the human rights
regime that privileges the rights of people in the here and now.
Such bias raises, however, the question of how the regulatory
force of this regime relates to the long-term effects of our
current actions and their possible impact on the rights of people
in the future. Do current human rights regulations take
account of such long-term effects?34

This Article seeks to overcome the bias that places less
significance on protecting future victims. It also supports the
growing movement to prioritize the prevention of human rights
abuses.35
I.

The Calculus of Regulation

Cost-benefit analysis is a decision-making methodology that
compares the risks and rewards associated with a particular

STATISTICAL LIVES, supra note 18 (containing articles discussing a bias towards
identified lives).
33. RICHARD H. THALER, MISBEHAVING: THE MAKING OF BEHAVIORAL
ECONOMICS 12–13 (2015); Alex Gosseries, On Future Generations’ Future Rights, 16
J. POL. PHIL. 446, 450 (2008).
34. See Marcus Düwell & Gerhard Bos, Human Rights and Future People—
Possibilities of Argumentation, 15 J. HUM. RTS. 231, 232 (2016); see also Bridget
Lewis, Human Rights Duties Towards Future Generations and the Potential for
Achieving Climate Justice, 34 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 206 (2016) (discussing the rights
of future generations as they relate to climate change); Kerri Woods, The Rights of
(Future) Humans Qua Humans, 15 J. HUM. RTS. 291, 297 (2016) (discussing the
theories under which future generations may or may not have rights).
35. See Rep. of the Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, The Role
of Prevention in the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/30/20 (2015); see also LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, HUMAN RIGHTS IN TIMES OF
CONFLICT AND TERRORISM 32–49 (2011) (discussing the obligations and the
realization of rights in international relations); Symposium, Rights to a Green
Future, 15 J. HUM. RTS. 231 (2016) (containing several articles describing rights and
ethics).
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decision.36 It is regularly used by governments, including the
United States, to justify the allocation of state resources.37
a. The Use of Cost-Benefit Analysis by Federal Agencies
In the United States, federal agencies are required to use costbenefit analysis in making regulatory decisions.38 The modern
origins of this methodology can be traced to President Ronald
Reagan’s 1981 Executive Order 12,291, which established a set of
requirements for regulatory agencies seeking to adopt new rules.39
However, it was Executive Order 12,866, promulgated by President
Bill Clinton in 1993, that created the foundation for the current
regulatory system.40 Executive Order 12,866 was designed to
improve efficiency in the regulatory process by requiring clear and
objective justifications for regulatory action. Thus, federal agencies
may only promulgate regulations in three situations: (1) when
regulations are required by law, (2) when regulations are necessary
to interpret the law, or (3) when regulations are “made necessary
36. See generally STEPHEN BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND
REGULATORY POLICY 155–61 (7th ed. 2011) (describing the process of cost-benefit
analysis); CHRISTOPHER HOOD ET AL., THE GOVERNMENT OF RISK: UNDERSTANDING
RISK REGULATION REGIMES 7 (2001) (giving a brief description of cost-benefit
analysis); Lisa A. Robinson, How US Government Agencies Value Mortality Risk
Reductions, 1 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 283, 283 (2007) (describing “approaches
used by federal agencies to estimate the value of changes in the risk of premature
mortality”).
37. BOARDMAN, supra note 11, at 20. The use of cost-benefit analysis is not
limited to governments. Corporations use cost-benefit analysis to make decisions on
which safety features to install in their products, thereby affecting the cost of these
products and presumably their mortality risks. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, Pricing
Lives for Corporate and Governmental Risk Decisions, 6 J. BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS
227 (2015) (discussing the use of cost-benefit analysis in corporations). Even
individuals make choices—from using certain modes of transportation to choosing
particular medical procedures—that involve balancing financial costs and mortality
risks. See, e.g., Jahn K. Hakes & W. Kip Viscusi, Automobile Seatbelt Usage and the
Value of Statistical Life, 73 SOUTHERN ECON. J. 659 (2007) (showing that people do
balance the costs and benefits of seatbelt use). Each of these decisions is made, in
part, through cost-benefit analysis.
See HAROLD WINTER, TRADE-OFFS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMIC REASONING AND SOCIAL ISSUES 18 (2d ed. 2013).
38. MAEVE P. CAREY, COST-BENEFIT AND OTHER ANALYSIS REQUIREMENTS IN
THE RULEMAKING PROCESS 2 (2013) (“[M]any federal agencies are currently required
to prepare cost-benefit analyses . . . .”). This regulatory process has been subject to
criticism. See, e.g., MCGARITY, supra note 32, at 8 (criticizing cost-benefit analysis
as ignoring important values).
39. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 19, 1981).
40. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993). Some
commentators trace the origins of the regulatory state even earlier. See JAMES T.
CAMPEN, BENEFIT, COST, AND BEYOND: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF BENEFIT-COST
ANALYSIS 16–21 (1986); PRINCIPLES AND STANDARDS FOR BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS
2–13 (Scott Farrow & Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. eds., 2013); Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei
Shleifer, The Rise of the Regulatory State, 41 J. ECON. LIT. 401 (2003).
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by compelling public need, such as material failures of private
markets to protect or improve the health and safety of the public,
the environment, or the well-being of the American people.”41
Cost-benefit analysis is an essential methodology for federal
agencies considering regulatory action.
Indeed, cost-benefit
analysis is the centerpiece of Executive Order 12,866. The order
requires federal agencies undertaking “significant regulatory
action” to prepare detailed regulatory plans (known as regulatory
impact assessments or regulatory impact analysis) that consider
the costs and benefits of proposed action.42 Such plans are not
required for every regulatory action. Rather, they are required
when regulatory action would result in a rule that may:
(1) Have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or
more or adversely affect in a material way the economy, a sector
of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the
environment, public health or safety, or State, local, or tribal
governments or communities;
(2) Create a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with
an action taken or planned by another agency;
(3) Materially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements,
grants, user fees, or loan programs or the rights and obligations
of recipients thereof; or
(4) Raise novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal
mandates, the President’s priorities, or the principles set forth
in this Executive order.43

Pursuant to Executive Order 12,866, regulatory impact
assessments must be submitted for review to the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA),44 which is located
within the White House’s Office of Management and Budget
(OMB).45 OIRA is led by a political appointee, who is nominated by
the President and confirmed by the U.S. Senate.46 OIRA is given
ninety days to review regulatory action, although this deadline can

41. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, §1 (Oct. 4, 1993).
42. Id. § 6(a)(3)(B), (C).
43. Id. § 3(f).
44. Id. § 6(b)(2).
45. Id. § 2(b). See, e.g., Scot J. Paltrow, How a Small White House Agency Stalls
Life-Saving Regulations, REUTERS (Oct. 29, 2015, 3:00 PM), http://www.reuters.com/
investigates/special-report/usa-regulations-oira/ (describing how OIRA slows down
the making of regulations).
46. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), REGINFO.GOV, https://www.reginfo.gov/
public/jsp/utilities/faq.jsp (last visited Oct. 28, 2017) (“The Office of the
Administrator was created by Congress when it established OIRA in the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1980. The Administrator is nominated by the President and
confirmed by the Senate.”).
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be extended.47 During the review process, OIRA consults with
numerous public and private entities.48 At the conclusion of the
review process, OIRA may approve the proposed regulatory action
or return it to the appropriate agency for further consideration.49
This can occur for several reasons.
If the rule is not compatible with the law, if the quality of the
agencys [sic] analysis is inadequate, if the regulation is not
justified by the analysis, if the rule is not consistent with the
regulatory principles stated in Executive Order 12866 or with
the Presidents [sic] policies and priorities, or if the rule
unnecessarily conflicts with other Executive Branch agency
regulations or efforts.50

In 2011, President Barack Obama adopted Executive Order
13,563 to reaffirm the principles set forth in Executive Order
12,866.51 This new executive order provides additional details on
the regulatory process. It acknowledges that the “regulatory system
must protect public health, welfare, safety and our environment
while promoting economic growth, innovation, competitiveness, and
job creation.”52 It emphasizes that regulatory decisions must be
based on the best available scientific information and must allow
for public participation.53 In particular, Executive Order 13,563
requires federal agencies to:
(1) propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned
determination that its benefits justify its costs (recognizing that
some benefits and costs are difficult to quantify);
(2) tailor its regulations to impose the least burden on society,
consistent with obtaining regulatory objectives, taking into
account, among other things, and to the extent practicable, the
costs of cumulative regulations;
(3) select, in choosing among alternative regulatory approaches,
those approaches that maximize net benefits (including
potential economic, environmental, public health and safety,
and other advantages; distributive impacts; and equity);
(4) to the extent feasible, specify performance objectives, rather
than specifying the behavior or manner of compliance that
47. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, § 6(b)(2) (Oct. 4, 1993).
48. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), supra note 46 (“OIRA’s policy is to meet
with any party interested in discussing issues on a rule under review, whether they
are from State or local governments, small business or other business interests, or
from the environmental, health, or safety communities.”).
49. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, § 6(b)(3) (Oct. 4, 1993).
50. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), supra note 46.
51. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3,821, § 1(b) (Jan. 21, 2011). See
Binyamin Appelbaum & Michael D. Shear, How the President Came to Embrace
Executive Power, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2016, at 1.
52. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3,821, § 1(a) (Jan. 21, 2011).
53. Id.
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regulated entities must adopt; and
(5) identify and assess available alternatives to direct
regulation, including providing economic incentives to
encourage the desired behavior, such as user fees or marketable
permits, or providing information upon which choices can be
made by the public.54

Executive Order 13,563 acknowledges the challenges posed by
certain regulatory actions. It recognizes that not all costs and
benefits are easily quantified or monetized. Accordingly, Executive
Order 13,563 indicates that agencies “may consider (and discuss
qualitatively) values that are difficult or impossible to quantify,
including equity, human dignity, fairness, and distributive
impacts.”55 Finally, Executive Order 13,563 requires federal
agencies to consider several principles in the regulatory process:
(1) The importance of public participation.
(2) The need to “promote . . . coordination, simplification, and
harmonization” across agencies.
(3) The importance of “identify[ing] and consider[ing]
regulatory approaches that reduce burdens and maintain
flexibility and freedom of choice for the public.”
(4) The need to “ensure the objectivity of any scientific and
technological
information
and
processes
used
to
support . . . regulatory actions.”
(5) The need to conduct retrospective analysis of regulations
that have already been adopted.56

To facilitate agency action, OMB issued Circular A-4 in 2003.57
Circular A-4 offers detailed instructions to federal agencies on
conducting cost-benefit analysis for proposed regulatory actions. At
the outset, Circular A-4 acknowledges the primacy of cost-benefit
analysis in regulatory analysis.58 It recognizes that cost-benefit
analysis can provide decision-makers with guidance on policy
decisions that will generate net benefits to society “even when
economic efficiency is not the only or the overriding public policy
objective.”59 At the same time, regulatory analysis can reveal the
shortcomings of proposed action.60 Circular A-4 highlights the
importance of considering alternative proposals in a regulatory

54. Id. § 1(b).
55. Id. § 1(c).
56. Id. §§ 2–6.
57. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR A4
(2003),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/circulars_a004_a-4/#2
[hereinafter CIRCULAR A-4].
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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impact assessment.61
Therefore, a good regulatory impact
assessment should not be limited to offering a single proposal for
consideration. Rather, it should identify and discuss competing
solutions to the underlying problem.
An essential feature of cost-benefit analysis is the ability to
monetize costs and benefits of proposed regulatory action.62 As
recognized in Executive Order 13,563, some costs and benefits may
be difficult to quantify or monetize. Despite such difficulties,
regulatory agencies are required to evaluate them.63 Accordingly,
Circular A-4 offers suggestions on how to address these situations.
Specifically, non-quantified costs and benefits should be examined
through break-even analysis, which answers the question: “[h]ow
small could the value of the non-quantified benefits be (or how large
would the value of the non-quantified costs need to be) before the
rule would yield zero net benefits?”64 The ensuing value would then
be incorporated into the cost-benefit analysis. The use of breakeven (or threshold) analysis is not uncommon and has been used in
a variety of situations to address benefits that are difficult to
monetize, including preventing terrorist attacks and reducing
prison rape.65
Finally, Circular A-4 emphasizes the importance of objectivity
and transparency in the preparation of regulatory impact
assessments. “Because of its influential nature and its special role
in the rulemaking process, it is appropriate to set minimum quality
standards for regulatory analysis.”66 Thus, regulatory analysis
must be “based on the best reasonably obtainable scientific,
technical, and economic information available.”67 Studies must be
replicable, and information used in these studies should be made
publicly available.68
Table 1 provides some examples of cost-benefit analysis
performed by the federal government in recent years.69 The benefits
and costs are designated in billions of dollars.
61. Id.
62. In measuring costs and benefits, Circular A-4 requires regulatory agencies to
address their impact on U.S. citizens and residents. Any foreign implications should
be treated separately. Id.
63. See Pub. Citizen v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 374 F.3d 1209, 1221
(D.C. Cir. 2004).
64. Circular A-4, supra note 57.
65. SUNSTEIN, VALUING LIFE, supra note 14, at 191–194.
66. CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 57, at 17.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 2014
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Table 1. Examples of Cost-Benefit Analysis
Federal
Agency
Department of
Transportation
(DOT)
Environmental
Transportation
Agency
Health
and
Human
Services
DOT

Nature of Proposed
Regulation
Ejection mitigation
for vehicles

Benefit
$1.5

$0.4

Pipeline safety
standards

$85.0

$13.0

$0.2

<$0.1

$35.0

$4.0

Cigarette warning
labels
Pilot age limits

Cost

In Table 1, the benefits of the proposed regulations outweighed the
costs. As a result, the proposed regulations were approved by OIRA
and subsequently implemented by the appropriate agency.
In sum, the regulation of risk is a complex and, at times,
controversial function of government. In the United States, costbenefit analysis is an essential feature of the regulatory approval
process.70 Hundreds of regulations are reviewed each year to
confirm that their expected benefits outweigh the expected costs.71
DRAFT REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL AND TRIBAL ENTITIES (2014),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/2014_cb/draft_
2014_cost_benefit_report-updated.pdf [hereinafter OMB 2014 Draft Report];
SUNSTEIN, VALUING LIFE, supra note 14, at 185–190.
70. In addition to Executive Order 12,866 and 13,563, other executive orders and
federal statutes apply to guide the regulatory process. See, e.g., Exec. Order 13,045,
62 Fed. Reg. 19,885 (Apr. 23, 1997) (requiring that agencies identify, assess, and
address “environmental health risks and safety risks that may disproportionately
affect children”); Exec. Order 13,211, 66 Fed. Reg. 28,355 (May 22, 2001) (“requiring
that agencies . . . prepare a Statement of Energy Effects when undertaking certain
agency actions”); Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-13 (109 Stat.
163) (requiring federal agencies to take steps to reduce burdens of data collection on
the federal government, states, and other entities); Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
of 1995, Pub. L. 104-4 (109 Stat. 48) (requiring federal agencies to include in their
analyses of regulations the economic effects of regulations on state, local, and tribal
governments).
71. Between 2003 and 2013, for example, OMB estimated the annual benefits for
major federal regulations were between $217 and $863 billion whereas the annual
costs were between $57 and $84 billion. OMB 2014 Draft Report, supra note 69, at
1–4; see also CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41140, HOW AGENCIES
MONETIZE “STATISTICAL LIVES” EXPECTED TO BE SAVED BY REGULATIONS 1–2 (2010)
(noting that Executive Order 12,866 requires that federal agencies conduct costbenefit analyses for “‘significant’ regulatory actions,” and that “in recent years, an
average of about 600 federal rules have been considered ‘significant’ each year”).
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b. The Value of a Statistical Life
The assessment of mortality risks is an important part of
regulatory analysis. Through VSL calculations, agencies monetize
the value of changes to mortality risks.72 The VSL is then used to
compare the financial costs of a particular action with the benefits
established by the reduced probability of death.
Because this terminology is subject to some controversy, a
subtle but critical clarification is necessary. A VSL calculation does
not measure or place an actual cost (or price) on human life.73
Rather, VSL calculations measure the value governments place on
the reduction in mortality risks rather than mortality itself.74 To
some critics, this is a distinction without a difference because
changes in mortality risks eventually manifest as actual lives that
are saved or lost in the studied population.75
The use of VSL calculations in cost-benefit analysis involves a
five-step process.76
i.

Step One

The first step is to identify the societal problem that needs to
be addressed. Executive Order 12,866 explains that federal
regulations should only be promulgated if they are required by
existing law or “are made necessary by compelling public need, such

72. Circular A-4 describes an additional methodology that measures the “value
of statistical life-years (VSLY) extended.” CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 57, at 30; see
also Cass R. Sunstein, Lives, Life-Years, and Willingness to Pay, 104 COLUM. L. REV.
205, 206 (2004) (arguing that the VSLY methodology should be used for cost-benefit
analyses) [hereinafter Sunstein, Lives, Life-Years].
73. CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 57. VSL analysis is often criticized because of the
perception that it places an actual value on human life. Trudy Ann Cameron,
Euthanizing the Value of a Statistical Life, 4 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 161, 163–
64 (2010).
74. W. Kip Viscusi, The Devaluation of Life, 3 REG. & GOVERNANCE 103, 105–06
(2009) (“An individual’s VSL amount is a measure of the rate at which he or she is
willing to pay for small reductions in mortality risk . . . . In contrast, measures of
compensation for wrongful death are not based on the willingness to pay for small
reductions in risk, but generally are tied to appropriate amounts to address the
financial losses to the individual’s survivors.”).
75. See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, The Rights of Statistical People, 24 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 189, 189 (2000) (“I argue that the use of cost-benefit analysis to evaluate lifesaving regulatory programs has . . . been justified by the creation of a new kind of
entity—the statistical person. A primary feature of the statistical person . . . is that
she is unidentified; she is no one’s sister, or daughter, or mother. Indeed, in one
conception, the statistical person is not a person at all, but rather only a collection of
risks.”) [hereinafter Heinzerling, Rights of Statistical People].
76. The five-step process comes from Circular A-4. CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 57.
For various scenarios using VSL calculations, see SUNSTEIN, VALUING LIFE, supra
note 14, at 49–64.
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as material failures of private markets to protect or improve the
health and safety of the public, the environment, or the well-being
of the American people.”77 Circular A-4 then provides examples of
the major forms of market failure, including externality, market
power, and inadequate or asymmetric information.78 Other reasons
for regulatory action include “improving governmental processes or
promoting intangible values such as distributional fairness or
privacy.”79
A common reason for government regulation is to reduce
mortality risks associated with a particular activity, product, or
phenomenon.80 These risks are typically denominated as a
percentage or ratio within a defined population (such as 1 in 10,000
or 1 in 100,000).81 Based on historical data and scientific studies,
mortality risks can be identified for countless societal problems,
from acceptable levels of carcinogens in drinking water to the lack
of safety features in automobiles.82
ii.

Step Two

The second step is to identify a proposed regulatory action that
addresses the underlying societal problem and determine the cost
for taking such action.83 Typically, regulations are drafted by
federal agencies, with feedback from numerous government entities
such as the Council of Economic Advisors, National Economic
Council, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and the
Domestic Policy Council.84 The general public is also provided an
opportunity to provide feedback on proposed regulations.85
iii.

Step Three

The third step is to calculate the appropriate VSL, which
quantifies the value associated with a reduction in mortality risks.86
The valuation of human life poses unique challenges. As noted by
Thomas Schelling, “[d]eath is indeed different from most consumer

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, § 1 (Oct. 4, 1993).
CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 57.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 38, 40.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
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events, and its avoidance different from most commodities.”87 But
as Schelling also recognized, it is possible to quantify the value of
reductions in mortality risks. Quite simply, “people have been
dying for as long as they have been living; and where life and death
are concerned we are all consumers. We nearly all want our lives
extended and are probably willing to pay for it.”88
Circular A-4 describes the VSL as the “sum of risk reductions
expected in a population.”89 There are several different approaches
for calculating the VSL.90 Revealed preference studies focus on the
actual choices people make, typically in the context of employment
decisions. For example, some studies examine differences in wages
attributable to a worker’s willingness to accept a greater (or lesser)
probability of death in his or her chosen profession. The following
summary provides a brief description of a revealed preference
study:
To estimate the value of a statistical life, economists can exploit
the difference in pay between two jobs and determine how much
of that difference stems from the difference in the risk of injury
or death. Then, the researchers simply multiply that number
by the inverse of the risk difference and call the result the value
of a statistical life.
For example, if I make $40,000 and my twin brother makes
$42,000 at a job that is identical to mine in all respects except
for a 1 percent greater chance of death, then an economist
assumes that the $2,000 difference is a premium my twin
brother requires to accept the riskier job. If he requires $2,000
for a 1 percent greater risk, then I can infer that he is placing a
value on his life of $2,000 x (1 ÷ 0.01), or $200,000.91

Stated preference studies focus on hypothetical choices and
usually involve extensive surveys. The surveys typically ask
respondents to identify their willingness to pay for reduced risks in
various hypothetical situations.92 The following summary provides
a brief description of a stated preference study:
87. Schelling, supra note 20, at 129.
88. Id. at 128–29.
89. CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 57.
90. Ike Brannon, What is a Life Worth?, 27 REG. 60, 60 (2004); see also Janusz R.
Mrozek & Laura O. Taylor, What Determines the Value of Life? A Meta-Analysis, 21
J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 253 (2002) (providing an overview of past analyses of
VSL estimates using compensating-wage equations).
91. Brannon, supra note 90, at 60.
92. Stated preference studies are also referred to as “contingent valuation.” Cf.
Paul Glimcher & Michael A. Livermore, What Is Nature Worth to You?, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 8, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/09/opinion/sunday/what-is-natureworth-to-you.html (demonstrating how “willingness to pay” studies may inform
natural resource protection). See generally Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L.
Spitzer, Willingness to Pay vs. Willingness to Accept: Legal and Economic
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In a contingent valuation estimation of the value of a statistical
life, the economist surveys a number of people and asks each
person the amount of money that he would require to accept a
marginally higher chance of dying in the near future.
Generally, the subject answers yes or no to a series of questions;
for example, the opening question might be, “Would you accept
$1,000 to move from a one in 10,000 chance of death to a five in
10,000 chance of death?” If the answer is yes, then the next
question might be whether the person would accept $800 to
assume the higher risk, and so on until the person says he
would refuse the money for the risk. After surveying a few
hundred people in this manner, the researcher imputes the
implicit value that each subject places on the value of a life, as
is done in the revealed preference method (multiplying the final
dollar figure by the inverse of the additional risk taken) and
averages the valuations.93

Several variables may be used to adjust VSL calculations. For
example, some mortality risks are valued differently and may result
in a higher VSL.94 Because cancer is both painful and expensive to
treat, reductions in cancer mortality rates may be valued at a
higher rate than other deaths.95 Deaths associated with terrorism
create profound social upheaval that may also justify a higher
VSL.96 In these scenarios, agencies may seek to adjust the base VSL
calculation.
Life expectancy considerations can also be used in cost-benefit
analysis, although such calculations have generated significant
controversy.97 One such effort was referred to as the “senior
discount” because it placed a lower value on the lives of older
Implications, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 59 (1993) (describing the potential problems with the
assumption that survey respondents will generally value “willingness to pay” and
“willingness to accept” similarly).
93. Brannon, supra note 90, at 61.
94. Cass R. Sunstein, Bad Deaths, 14 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 259, 261–65
(1997); see also Fredrik Carlsson et al., Is Transport Safety More Valuable in the Air?,
28 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 147, 147 (2004) (discussing why people might be willing
to pay more for risk reductions in air travel than taxi travel, even though “[m]ost of
us know that it is safer to fly compared to traveling by most other transport modes”).
95. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, VALUING MORTALITY RISK REDUCTIONS FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: A WHITE PAPER 20–21 (2010); James K. Hammitt & JinTau Liu, Effects of Disease Type and Latency on the Value of Mortality Risk, 28 J.
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 73 (2004).
96. Lisa A. Robinson et al., Valuing the Risk of Death from Terrorist Attacks, 7
J. HOMELAND SECURITY & EMERGENCY MGMT. 1 (2010); W. Kip Viscusi, Valuing
Risks of Death from Terrorism and Natural Disasters, 38 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY
191 (2009).
97. Robinson, supra note 36, at 287; see also Memorandum from John D.
Graham, Administrator, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of
Management and Budget to the President’s Management Council on Benefit-Cost
Methods and Lifesaving Rules (May 30, 2003) (advising agencies to discontinue use
of an “age-adjustment factor” in computing an estimated VSL).
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citizens.98 In these situations, VSL calculations are assigned based
on age-related differences and, typically, the VSL calculations
decrease as age increases. Even a “child premium” has been
proposed.99 A related but distinct consideration is to measure the
value of a statistical life-year (VSLY), which represents the value of
each year of life extended.100 An even more nuanced calculation
measures the quality-adjusted life-year (QALY), which is meant to
capture the quality of life-years saved.101
Another controversial issue is whether VSL calculations
should vary by income or wealth.102 It is certainly correct to say
that human beings have individualized preferences, which include
differences in risk tolerance and hedonic needs. Such preferences
may also be influenced by levels of income. It should not be
surprising, therefore, that some people may be less willing to pay
for reduced risks on certain issues. “[I]ndividuals display a great
deal of heterogeneity in their VSL—not simply because of different
tastes and values, but also because of different levels of income and
wealth. Willingness to pay depends on ability to pay.”103 Similarly,
wealth disparities may influence a willingness to accept greater
risk.
Because VSL calculations are influenced by various factors,
these calculations can differ from year to year. In the United States,
no single VSL is used by all federal agencies, although Circular A4 indicates that academic research offers a VSL range from $1
million to $10 million.104 Accordingly, VSL calculations may differ
98. John J. Fialka, EPA to Stop ‘Death Discount’ to Value New Regulations, WALL
STREET J., May 8, 2003, at D3; Katharine Q. Seelye & John Tierney, EPA Drops AgeBased Cost Studies, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2003, at A34; Cindy Skrzycki, Under Fire,
EPA Drops the ‘Senior Death Discount,’ WASH. POST (May 13, 2003),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/business/2003/05/13/under-fire-epa-dropsthe-senior-death-discount/e14279ed-9109-40e5-998b-fd3a1620799c/?utm_
term=.d30076de282f; What’s a Granny Worth?, WASH. TIMES (July 7, 2003),
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2003/jul/6/20030706-104810-2250r/.
99. Sean Hannon Williams, Statistical Children, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 63 (2013).
100. See Sunstein, Lives, Life-Years, supra note 72, at 249–250 (“No regulatory
program makes people immortal. The only issue is life extension, and here the length
of the extension surely matters.”).
101. See, e.g., Franco Sassi, Calculating QALYs, Comparing QALY and DALY
Calculations, 21 HEALTH POL’Y & PLAN. 402 (2006) (“provid[ing] a comprehensive
formulation of QALY calculation methods”); Richard Zeckhauser & Donald Shepard,
Where Now for Saving Lives?, 40 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 11 (1976) (introducing the
“QALY” term).
102. See Cass R. Sunstein, Are Poor People Worth Less Than Rich People?
Disaggregating the Value of Statistical Lives, 3 (John M. Olin Program in L. & Econ.,
Working Paper No. 207, 2004) (suggesting “that a uniform value is obtuse”).
103. Id. at 44.
104. CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 57, at 30.
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by agency and by issue.105 In 2013, for example, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) used a VSL of $9.7 million in its regulatory
analyses.106 The EPA has used VSL calculations to study a variety
of issues, including the impact of the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water
Act, and other pollution rules that affect human life. In 2014, the
Department of Transportation (DOT) used a VSL of $9.2 million.107
The DOT has used VSL calculations to consider vehicle safety
standards and highway construction projects. Other federal
agencies have used different VSL estimates when considering
regulatory decisions that implicate human life.108
Figure 1 illustrates how VSL calculations of several federal
agencies have changed over the past twenty-five years.109

Figure 1. VSL Calculations over Time
EPA

DOT
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Millions of Dollars
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** Food and Drug Administration

105. Id.; Robinson, supra note 36, at 288–294.
106. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, VALUING MORTALITY RISK REDUCTIONS FOR
POLICY: A META-ANALYTIC APPROACH 2 (Feb. 2016), https://yosemite.epa.gov/sab/
sabproduct.nsf/0/0CA9E925C9A702F285257F380050C842/$File/VSL%20white%20
paper_final_020516.pdf; U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING
ECONOMIC ANALYSES 7–8 (Dec. 17, 2010), https://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/
eerm.nsf/vwAN/EE-0568-50.pdf/$file/EE-0568-50.pdf (last updated May 2014)
[hereinafter EPA GUIDELINES].
107. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., GUIDANCE ON THE TREATMENT OF THE ECONOMIC
VALUE OF A STATISTICAL LIFE IN U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION ANALYSES—
2015
ADJUSTMENT
(2015),
https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/
files/docs/VSL2015_0.pdf [hereinafter DOT GUIDANCE].
108. Robinson, supra note 36, at 293–294; Heinzerling, Rights of Statistical
People, supra note 75, at 191.
109. See EPA GUIDELINES, supra note 106, at app. B-1; DOT GUIDANCE, supra
note 107, at 1; see also Kate Sheppard, The Value of a Human Life, MOTHER JONES
(July 26, 2011), http://www.motherjones.com/blue-marble/2011/07/statistical-valuehuman-life.
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As shown, VSL calculations have generally increased over the
years. This reflects several factors, including inflation and more
nuanced studies on mortality risks.
iv.

Step Four

The fourth step is to conduct a standard cost-benefit analysis
that compares the costs of the proposed regulatory action (Step
Two) with the benefits (multiply the number of people identified in
Step One who may be saved by the VSL identified in Step Three).
This process is used to determine the net benefits (or costs) of a
proposed regulation with respect to mortality. As part of this
process, regulators will discount the value of future costs and
benefits.110 This allows for an estimation of the net benefits (or
costs) of a regulation in light of price inflation, uncertainty, and the
rate-of-time preference. Because regulations that address mortality
risks will often reduce nonfatal injuries, the reduction of nonfatal
injuries is often factored into the analysis. These nonfatal injuries
are typically designated as equivalent lives saved. Other benefits
not reflected in the VSL calculation may also be included in the
analysis. These can include legal costs, administrative costs,
property damage, and medical expenses.111
v.

Step Five

The final step is to decide whether government action is
warranted in light of expected costs and benefits. VSL calculations
play a critical role in this cost-benefit analysis. If the costs are less
than the expected benefits, the regulation will likely be adopted. If
the costs are more than the expected benefits, the regulation will be
subject to further critical review. Typically, a proposed regulation
will not be adopted if the costs exceed the benefits. There are,
however, several reasons why an agency might adopt a rule even if
costs exceed benefits.112 “Perhaps the law requires them to proceed
110. Circular A-4 recommends that discount rates of 3% and 7% be used in
regulatory impact analysis. CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 57, at 33–34.
111. See, e.g., LAWRENCE BLINCOE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., NAT’L HIGHWAY
TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF MOTOR VEHICLE CRASHES 2000,
REP. NO. DOT HS 809 446 (May 2002).
112. See, e.g., Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst., v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 509 (1981) (“Thus,
§ 6(b)(5) directs the Secretary to issue the standard that ‘most adequately
assures . . . that no employee will suffer material impairment of health,’ limited only
by the extent to which this is ‘capable of being done.’ In effect . . . Congress itself
defined the basic relationship between costs and benefits, by placing the ‘benefit’ of
worker health above all other considerations save those making attainment of this
‘benefit’ unachievable. Any standard based on a balancing of costs and benefits by
the Secretary that strikes a different balance than that struck by Congress would be
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even if the monetized benefits are lower than the monetized costs.
Perhaps the relevant rule has nonmonetizable benefits that are
hard to quantify but nonetheless important to consider.”113
In sum, cost-benefit analysis and VSL calculations are used to
make regulatory decisions on a variety of issues that implicate
human life. On some occasions, regulatory action will not be
approved because the costs outweigh the expected benefits. On
other occasions, regulatory action may be approved. If the
regulatory action is approved, VSL calculations will influence the
cost-benefit analysis and may lead to the acceptance of higher levels
of mortality risk. While these regulatory decisions have a profound
impact on human life, they have not been subject to meaningful
critique as to their compliance with human rights law.
II. The Right to Life in Human Rights Law
The right to life is the seminal human right and, accordingly,
it is codified in numerous human rights treaties and declarations:114
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of person.115
—Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be
protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.116
—International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Every person has the right to have his life respected. This right shall be
protected by law and, in general, from the moment of conception. No one
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.117
—American Convention on Human Rights

inconsistent with the command set forth in § 6(b)(5). Thus, cost-benefit analysis by
OSHA [Occupational Safety and Health Administration] is not required by the
statute because feasibility analysis is.”).
113. SUNSTEIN, VALUING LIFE, supra note 14, at 37.
114. See ELIZABETH WICKS, THE RIGHT TO LIFE AND CONFLICTING INTERESTS
(2010) [hereinafter WICKS, CONFLICTING INTERESTS]; THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (B.G. Ramcharan ed., 1985).
115. UDHR, supra note 2, art. 3.
116. ICCPR, supra note 5, art. 6(1).
117. American Convention on Human Rights art. 4(1), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123, 145 [hereinafter American Convention].
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Every human being has the right to life, liberty and the security of his
person.118
—American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man
Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived
of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court
following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by
law.119
—European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms
Human beings are inviolable. Every human being shall be entitled to
respect for his life and the integrity of his person. No one may be
arbitrarily deprived of this right.120
—African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights

The right to life is recognized in other international norms,
including the prohibitions against genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes.121 In all its manifestations, the right to
life constitutes a jus cogens obligation, meaning it is non-derogable
and binds all states.122 In fact, violation of the right to life can give
rise to both civil and criminal liability.123
The right to life norm protects a person’s life and their right to
exist.124 It prohibits the arbitrary deprivation of life. In particular,
118. American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man art. I, O.A.S. Res.
XXX, May 2, 1948, reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the
Inter-American System, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1, at 17 (1992).
119. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 2(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 224 [hereinafter European
Convention].
120. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 4, June 27, 1981, 1520
U.N.T.S. 217, 247.
121. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5, July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
122. See, e.g., ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, PEREMPTORY NORMS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006); W. Paul Gormley, The Right to Life and the Rule of NonDerogability: Peremptory Norms of Jus Cogens, in THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 114, at 135–136.
123. See, e.g., BETH STEPHENS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION
IN U.S. COURTS 195–98 (2d ed. 2008); M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 300–05 (2d rev. ed. 1999) (noting that
every legal system has criminalized murder).
124. The respect for, and protection of, human dignity is a natural extension of
the right to life norm. See, e.g., Adeno Addis, Human Dignity in Comparative
Constitutional Context: In Search of an Overlapping Consensus, 2 J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 1 (2015); Elizabeth Wicks, The Meaning of “Life:” Dignity and the Right to Life in
International Human Rights Treaties, 12 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 199 (2012) [hereinafter
Wicks, Meaning of Life]; see also DONNA HICKS, DIGNITY: ITS ESSENTIAL ROLE IN
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it establishes two complementary obligations on states.125 It
imposes negative obligations, which means states are prohibited
from taking human life. And it imposes positive obligations, which
means states must take affirmative steps to protect human life.
Thus, a state violates the right to life norm if it engages in
extrajudicial killings. This is, perhaps, the most common example
of the norm. But, a state also violates the right to life norm if it fails
to affirmatively address other threats to human life:126
The right to life implies not only the negative obligation not
to deprive anyone of life arbitrarily, but also the positive
obligation to take all necessary measures to secure that that
basic right is not violated. Such interpretation of the right to
life, so as to comprise positive measures of protection on the
part of the State, finds support nowadays in international caselaw as well as doctrine. There can no longer be any doubt that
the fundamental right to life belongs to the domain of jus
cogens.127

While the distinction between negative and positive rights has
been subject to some criticism, it is now firmly established and helps
clarify the expansive nature of the right to life norm and the
affirmative obligations it imposes on states.128 This should not be
RESOLVING CONFLICT (2012); MICHAEL ROSEN, DIGNITY: ITS HISTORY AND MEANING
(2012); THE RIGHT TO LIFE AND THE VALUE OF LIFE (Jon Yorke ed., 2010); Alan
Gewirth, Human Dignity as the Basis for Rights, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS:
HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 10 (Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent
eds., 1992); Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of
Human Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 655, 723 (2008). The connection between the right
to life norm and human dignity is significant because the concept of dignity broadens
the protections afforded to life and the attendant obligations of the state.
125. See SANDRA FREDMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS TRANSFORMED: POSITIVE RIGHTS AND
POSITIVE DUTIES (2008); ALASTAIR MOWBRAY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF POSITIVE
OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS BY THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2004); Dinah Shelton & Ariel Gould, Positive
and Negative Obligations, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW 562 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2013).
126. See NOWAK, supra note 6, at 123 (describing threats “such as malnutrition,
life-threatening illness, nuclear energy or armed conflict”); Franz Christian Ebert &
Romina I. Sijniensky, Preventing Violations of the Right to Life in the European and
the Inter-American Human Rights Systems: From the Osman Test to A Coherent
Doctrine on Risk Prevention?, 15 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 343, 343–44 (2015) (noting the
general consensus “that merely abstaining from inflicting death is insufficient for
safeguarding the right to life”); Jeremy McBride, Protecting Life: A Positive
Obligation to Help, 24 EUR. L. REV. 43 (1999); David Weissbrodt, Protecting the Right
to Life: International Measures Against Arbitrary or Summary Killings by
Governments, in THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 114, at 297.
127. Villagrán-Morales v. Guatemala, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
63, ¶ 2 (Nov. 19, 1999) (Cançado Trindade & Abreu Burelli, JJ., joint concurring
opinion) (citations omitted).
128. The distinction between negative and positive rights is most closely
associated with the debate between civil and political rights and economic, social,
and cultural rights. Some commentators criticize the distinction because it
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surprising. Limiting the right to life norm so that it only addresses
negative obligations would make it less effective in its scope and
reach.
This makes sense when we consider that the most pressing
threats to human life, even in relatively affluent Western
states, are everyday obstacles such as poverty, starvation, lack
of adequate medical care, and lack of housing. The threat of a
police officer shooting to kill is more shocking but less frequent.
There has to be room within the ambit of a right to life for both
such types of threat if human life is really to be accorded the
respect that a human right to it implies.129

A review of human rights practice demonstrates the growing
implications of the right to life norm on state practice.
a. The U.N. Human Rights Committee
The U.N. Human Rights Committee, which was established to
monitor implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), acknowledged the expansive nature of the
right to life norm in one of its earliest pronouncements.130
According to the Human Rights Committee, the right to life norm
imposes an affirmative obligation on states to protect human life.
This position was acknowledged by the Committee in its General
Comment No. 6 on the right to life.
[T]he Committee has noted that the right to life has been too
often narrowly interpreted. The expression “inherent right to
life” cannot properly be understood in a restrictive manner, and
the protection of this right requires that States adopt positive
measures. In this connection, the Committee considers that it
would be desirable for States parties to take all possible
measures to reduce infant mortality and to increase life
expectancy, especially in adopting measures to eliminate
malnutrition and epidemics.131

This positive obligation is not limited to protecting against
harms caused by state action. It extends to harms caused by private

facilitates the fragmentation of human rights. Others view the distinction between
positive and negative rights as increasingly unclear as rights evolve. See PHILIP
ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 181–85 (2013) (noting
how rights and classifications “broaden and contract” over time); M. MAGDALENA
SEPULVEDA, THE NATURE OF THE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL
COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 122–33 (2003).
129. Wicks, Meaning of Life, supra note 124, at 207.
130. See generally SARAH JOSEPH & MELISSA CASTAN, THE INTERNATIONAL
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND COMMENTARY
13–24 (3d ed. 2013) (providing information on the composition, function, and notable
decisions of the Human Rights Committee).
131. Human Rights Comm., Gen. Comment No. 6, supra note 10, at ¶ 5.
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actors.132 This was recognized by the Committee in its General
Comment No. 31 on the obligations imposed on states by the
ICCPR.
[T]he positive obligations on States Parties to ensure Covenant
rights will only be fully discharged if individuals are protected
by the state, not just against violations of Covenant rights by
its agents, but also against acts committed by private persons
or entities that would impair the enjoyment of Covenant rights
in so far as they are amenable to application between private
persons or entities.133

A proposed draft for a new General Comment No. 36 by the
Human Rights Committee on the right to life reaffirms and expands
the scope of this international obligation.134 It notes, for example,
that states “are under an obligation to take appropriate positive
measure[s] in order to protect life from all possible threats,
including from threats emanating from private persons and
entities.”135 In addition, “[t]he duty to protect life also imposes on
States parties a due diligence obligation to take long-term measures
to address the general conditions in society that may eventually
give rise to direct threats to life.”136 The proposed General
Comment indicates that this obligation extends to a wide variety of
life-threatening phenomena, from disease, poverty, and starvation
to pervasive traffic and industrial accidents.137
States that have ratified the ICCPR may also ratify the
accompanying Optional Protocol which grants the Human Rights
Committee the competence “to receive and consider
communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who
claim to be victims of a violation by that State Party of any of the
rights set forth in the Covenant.”138 In several decisions, the

132. See Jan Arno Hessbruegge, Human Rights Violations Arising from Conduct
of Non-State Actors, 11 BUFFALO HUM. RTS. L. REV. 21, 23 (2005) (“Today, the
continuing shift of power into the non-state sphere makes the issue of how the
actions of those within that sphere will be treated, one of the most critical human
rights matters of our time.”).
133. Human Rights Comm., Gen. Comment No. 31: The Nature of the General
Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant ¶ 8, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004).
134. Human Rights Comm., Draft Gen. Comment No. 36, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/GC/R.36/Rev.2 (Sept. 2, 2015).
135. Id. ¶ 23.
136. Id. ¶ 28.
137. Id.
138. G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), at 59, Optional Protocol to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (Dec. 19, 1966).
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Committee has indicated that the obligation to protect human life
creates a positive obligation on states.139
In Lantsova v. Russian Federation, for example, the Human
Rights Committee considered a claim filed by the mother of the
victim, who died in government detention.140 While the victim was
healthy when he was first detained by Russian authorities, his
medical condition soon deteriorated.141 Despite his worsening
medical condition, he was provided limited medical assistance.142
According to the communication, “the Russian Federation violated
her son’s fundamental human rights by causing his death as a
result of confinement under conditions unfit for human survival,
and that it also failed in its obligation to provide any meaningful
legal protection against such violations.”143 The Human Rights
Committee found the communication admissible and held that
Russia had failed to comply with its obligation to protect the right
to life.144
The Committee notes that the State party has not refuted the
causal link between the conditions of the detention of Mr.
Lantsov and the fatal deterioration of his state of health.
Further, even if the Committee starts from the assertion of the
State party that neither Mr. Lantsov himself nor his codetainees had requested medical help in time, the essential fact
remains that the State party by arresting and detaining
individuals takes the responsibility to care for their life. It is
up to the State party by organizing its detention facilities to
know about the state of health of the detainees as far as may be
reasonably expected. Lack of financial means cannot reduce
this responsibility. The Committee considers that a properly
functioning medical service within the detention centre could
and should have known about the dangerous change in the
state of health of Mr. Lantsov. It considers that the State party
failed to take appropriate measures to protect Mr. Lantsov’s life
during the period he spent in the detention centre.145

This decision is significant in two respects.146 First, it
acknowledges a state’s positive obligation to protect human life.
139. JOSEPH & CASTAN, supra note 130, at 167–185 (detailing cases interpreting
Article 6 of the ICCPR).
140. Comm’n No. 763/1997, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/74/D/763/1997 (2002).
141. Id. ¶ 2.2.
142. Id.
143. Id. ¶ 3.
144. Id. ¶ 9.2.
145. Id.
146. See Dermit Barbato v. Uruguay, Comm’n No. 84/81, ¶ 9.4, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/OP/2 at 112 (1990) (holding that exhaustion of local remedies is not required
where the remedies are “de jure or de facto” unavailable to the victim). But see EHP
v. Canada, Comm’n No. 67/1980, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 at 20 (1984) (finding
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States must actively protect human life, particularly when the
individual is under state control. Indeed, protection must be
provided even if the victim has not requested it.147 Second, the
decision recognizes that claims of financial difficulties cannot
obviate state responsibility. The obligation to protect human life is
absolute, and a state may not reject this obligation by claiming a
lack of financial means.
In cases involving the right to life, the Committee has
interpreted the meaning of victim to include individuals who have
suffered past harms as well as risks of future harm, although such
harm must be imminent. According to the Committee,
[f]or a person to claim to be a victim of a violation of a right
protected by the Covenant, he or she must show either that an
act or an omission of a State party has already adversely
affected his or her enjoyment of such right, or that such an
effect is imminent, for example on the basis of existing law
and/or judicial or administrative decision or practice.148

On some occasions, the Human Rights Committee has found a
case inadmissible because the claimed victim failed to establish the
imminence of the risk to human life. In E.W. v. Netherlands, the
Committee considered a claim brought by thousands of Dutch
citizens that the deployment of nuclear weapons in their country
threatened their lives and constituted a violation of the right to life
norm.149 The petitioners asserted that by deploying nuclear
weapons in the country, the government had made them a target
for possible reprisal, thereby placing their lives in danger.150 The
Committee disagreed:
The Committee finds that the preparations for deployment of
cruise missiles . . . and the continuing deployment of other
nuclear weapons in the Netherlands did not, at the relevant
period of time, place the authors in the position to claim to be
victims whose right to life was then violated or under imminent
prospect of violation.151

that a State can require a complainant to exhaust local remedies, even if the right to
life is seriously threatened and the remedies entail delay).
147. See Barbato, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2 at 114, ¶ 10 (holding that “appropriate
measures” to protect a detainee’s life included provision of medical services, even
when unrequested).
148. E.W. v. Netherlands, Comm’n No. 429/1990, ¶ 6.4, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/47/D/429/1990 at 14 (1993).
149. Id. ¶ 1.
150. Id. ¶ 3.8.
151. Id. ¶ 6.4.
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A similar decision was reached in Aalbersberg v. Netherlands.152
While the Committee did not provide further elaboration, the
imminence of the risk presumably referred to temporal imminence.
On other occasions, the Human Rights Committee has upheld
claims where the imminence of the risk to human life was not
measured in days or even weeks. Rather, the Committee focused
on whether there was a “real risk” of death. In Yin Fong v.
Australia, the Human Rights Committee considered the claim of an
individual detained in Australia who was facing extradition to
China.153 The petitioner alleged that her extradition would subject
her to a possible death sentence and, therefore, her extradition
would violate the right to life norm.154 While she had not yet been
charged with a capital offense, the Committee held the potential for
such a charge was sufficient to implicate the right to life norm.155
To hold otherwise would be problematic because “the risk to the
author’s life would only be definitively established when it is too
late for the State party to protect her right to life under article 6 of
the Covenant.”156 The Committee added it was not necessary to
prove “that the author ‘will’ be sentenced to death but that there is
a ‘real risk’ that the death penalty will be imposed on her.”157 Other
cases have focused on whether the threat to human life is a
“necessary and foreseeable consequence” of state action.158
In addition to the Human Rights Committee, several human
rights tribunals have addressed the positive obligation to protect
the right to life.159 These cases reveal the growing breadth and
152. Comm’n No. 1440/2005, ¶ 6.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/87/D/1440/2005 (2006)
(holding that the State actor’s stance on nuclear weaponry did not create an “existing
or imminent” violation of the right to life); see also Bordes v. France, Comm’n No.
645/1995, ¶ 5.9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/57/D/645/1995 (1996) (noting in dicta, however,
that “the designing, testing, manufacture, possession and deployment of nuclear
weapons are among the greatest threats to the right to life which confront mankind
today”) (emphasis omitted).
153. Comm’n No. 1442/2005, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/97/D/1442/2005 (2009).
154. Id. ¶ 3.1.
155. Id. ¶ 9.5.
156. Id.
157. Id. ¶ 9.6 (citations omitted); see also Israil v. Kazakhstan, Comm’n No.
2024/2011, ¶ 9.5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/103/D/2024/2011 (2011) (holding that the
author, having proven a “real risk” of suffering torture or execution if extradited to
China, was owed a remedy).
158. See Bakhtiyari v. Australia, Comm’n No. 1069/2002, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/79/D/1069/2002 (2003); Judge v. Canada, Comm’n No. 829/1998, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/78/D/829/1998 (2002).
159. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which was
established to monitor the implementation of and compliance with the African
Charter, has made similar statements about the positive obligations to protect the
right to life. In General Comment No. 3, the African Commission stated that “[t]he
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depth of this obligation. And, they establish the parameters of state
responsibility for protecting potential victims from the loss of life.
b. The European Court of Human Rights
Osman v. United Kingdom is one of the earliest decisions from
the European Court of Human Rights to recognize a state’s positive
obligation to protect human life.160 In Osman, the applicants
brought an action against the United Kingdom for the failure of
local officials to prevent a private citizen from killing two
individuals and wounding two others.161 The European Court
right to life should be interpreted broadly” and that the state “has a positive duty to
protect individuals and groups from real and immediate risks to their lives caused
either by actions or inactions of third parties.” African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights, Gen. Comment No. 3 on the African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights, ¶ 41 (Nov. 4–18, 2015). Accordingly, states have an obligation to take
“preventive steps to preserve and protect the natural environment and humanitarian
responses to natural disasters, famines, outbreaks of infectious diseases, or other
emergencies.” Id. States also have an obligation “to address more chronic yet
pervasive threats to life, for example with respect to preventable maternal mortality,
by establishing functioning health systems and eliminating discriminatory laws and
practices which impact on individuals’ and groups’ ability to seek healthcare.” Id. ¶
42; see also Social and Economic Rights Action Center v. Nigeria, African
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Comm’n No. 155/96, ¶ 44 (2001)
(“Internationally accepted ideas of the various obligations engendered by human
rights indicate that all rights, both civil and political rights and social and economic,
generate at least four levels of duties for a State that undertakes to adhere to a rights
regime, namely the duty to respect, protect, promote, and fulfil these rights. These
obligations universally apply to all rights and entail a combination of negative and
positive duties.”). See generally Alain Didier Olinga, The African Charter on Human
and Peoples’ Rights and Positive Obligations, 15 INTERIGHTS BULL. 117 (2006)
(describing the African Commission’s approach to enforcing states’ positive
obligations to protect human rights).
160. App. No. 23452/94, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. 245 (1998). See generally DIMITRIS
XENOS, THE POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS OF THE STATE UNDER THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2012) [hereinafter XENOS, POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS]
(asserting that states, at a minimum, must create systems to prevent harm to
citizens and provide remedies upon violating that obligation); Colm O’Cinneide, A
Modest Proposal: Destitution, State Responsibility and the European Convention on
Human Rights, 2008 EUR. H.R. L. REV. 583 (suggesting a state’s failure to protect
against abject poverty could occasionally constitute a Convention violation); Dimitris
Xenos, Asserting the Right to Life (Article 2, ECHR) in the Context of Industry, 8
GERMAN L.J. 231 (2007) [hereinafter Xenos, Right to Life] (assessing a state’s
obligations in the context of industrial regulation); JEAN-FRANCOISE AKANDJIKOMBE, POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS (2007) (articulating each positive obligation embodied by the Convention);
DOUWE KORFF, THE RIGHT TO LIFE: A GUIDE TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE
TWO OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 6 (2006) (providing methods
of handling Convention violations according to European Court precedent);
Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, The Evolving Jurisprudence of the European Convention
Concerning the Right to Life, 19 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 21 (2001) (advocating for a
streamlined jurisprudence to more effectively handle Convention violations).
161. Osman, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep. at ¶ 10.
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began its analysis by acknowledging the expansive nature of the
right to life norm as codified in Article 2 of the European
Convention, which “enjoins the State not only to refrain from the
intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also to take appropriate
steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction.”162 This
is a positive obligation to protect those whose lives are at risk. The
Court cautioned, however, that this obligation does not require a
state to take action with respect to every possible risk to life.
[B]earing in mind the difficulties involved in policing modern
societies, the unpredictability of human conduct and the
operational choices which must be made in terms of priorities
and resources, such an obligation must be interpreted in a way
which does not impose an impossible or disproportionate
burden on the authorities.163

The Court then established a two-part test for determining
whether a state had violated its positive obligation to protect the
right to life in cases involving the criminal acts of others. First, it
must be established “that the authorities knew or ought to have
known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to
the life of an identified individual or individuals from the criminal
acts of a third party . . . .”164 Second, the authorities “failed to take
measures within the scope of their powers which, judged
reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk.”165 The
Court rejected the argument that this required an applicant to
establish gross negligence or a willful disregard by the government.
“[I]t is sufficient for an applicant to show that the authorities did
not do all that could be reasonably expected of them to avoid a real
and immediate risk to life of which they have or ought to have
knowledge.”166 Since the Court did not find sufficient evidence to
support the assertion that the police knew or should have known
about the potential risk facing the victims, it concluded that the
United Kingdom had not violated the right to life norm in this
case.167
The European Court subsequently extended its decision in
Osman to address state liability in cases of environmental
disasters.168 In Öneryıldız v. Turkey, two applicants brought a

162. Id. ¶ 115.
163. Id. ¶ 116.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. ¶ 121.
168. See also Wicks, Meaning of Life, supra note 124, at 205 (discussing the right
to life as inextricably linked to the right to a “clean and healthy environment”);
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claim against the Turkish government following a methane
explosion at a landfill that killed their relatives and caused
extensive property damage.169 The applicants alleged that Turkey
had failed to fulfill its obligation to protect human life by not
mitigating mortal risks emanating from natural or human
causes.170 Turkey responded that the elements of “immediacy” and
“reality” had not been established.171 And, in any event, Turkey
could not be held responsible for the deaths or property damage
because the victims had voluntarily chosen to live there and they
were aware of the risks.172 A Chamber of the Court ruled in favor
of the applicants, and the Grand Chamber of the Court affirmed.173
The European Court first acknowledged the expansive nature of the
right to life norm and its applicability to any activity in which
human life is at stake. “[T]he Court reiterates that Article 2 does
not solely concern deaths resulting from the use of force by agents
of the State but also . . . lays down a positive obligation on States to
take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within their
jurisdiction.”174 The Court added that “this obligation must be
construed as applying in the context of any activity, whether public
or not, in which the right to life may be at stake.”175 The Court then
distinguished between the substantive and procedural aspects of
Article 2. Substantively, the right to life norm requires affirmative
action by the state to safeguard human life by deterring potential
threats.
This obligation indisputably applies in the particular context of
dangerous activities, where, in addition, special emphasis must
be placed on regulations geared to the special features of the
activity in question, particularly with regard to the level of the
potential risk to human lives. They must govern the licensing,
setting up, operation, security and supervision of the activity
and must make it compulsory for all those concerned to take
practical measures to ensure the effective protection of citizens

XENOS, POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS, supra note 160, at 239 (tracing the Court’s postOsman expansions of Convention enforcement frameworks); Kristian C. Lauta &
Jens E. Rytter, A Landslide on a Mudslide? Natural Hazards and the Right to Life
Under the European Convention on Human Rights, 7 J. HUM. RTS. & ENV’T 111
(2016) (investigating the expansion of the right to life norm to include natural and
industrial hazards).
169. App. No. 48939/99, 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 325 (2005).
170. Id. ¶ 2.
171. Id. ¶ 77.
172. Id. ¶ 80.
173. Id. passim.
174. Id. ¶ 71 (citations omitted).
175. Id.
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whose lives might be endangered by the inherent risks.176

Procedurally, the right to life norm requires states to provide
an appropriate response in cases where lives have been lost. The
Court determined that Turkey had violated both aspects of the right
to life. Turkish officials knew or should have known that there was
a real and immediate risk to human life for persons living near the
landfill.177 “They consequently had a positive obligation under
Article 2 of the Convention to take such preventive operational
measures as were necessary and sufficient to protect those
individuals, especially as they themselves had set up the site and
authorised its operation, which gave rise to the risk in question.”178
Following the fatal accident, Turkish authorities had failed to
properly respond, thereby precluding effective accountability or
“deterring similar life-endangering conduct” in the future.179 For
these reasons, the Court found Turkey in violation of the European
Convention and awarded approximately 160,000 euros to the
applicants.180
In Budayeva v. Russia, six applicants brought a claim against
the Russian government following a mudslide that killed one
person, injured several other people, and destroyed extensive
property.181 The applicants alleged Russian public authorities had
been negligent in maintaining a dam, in monitoring the area for
possible mudslides, and in providing emergency warnings to local
communities in the event of mudslides.182 The Russian government
rejected liability by arguing the mudslide was unpredictable and
the ensuing harm could not have been avoided.183 “It was an act of
God, the time and the extent of which could neither be foreseen nor
influenced. Even if the mudslide had been forecast, no effective
technical measures could have prevented a catastrophe on that
scale at such short notice.”184 The European Court rejected these
arguments, arguing that the positive obligation to protect life
“entails above all a primary duty on the State to put in place a
legislative and administrative framework designed to provide

176. Id. ¶ 90.
177. Id. ¶¶ 100–01.
178. Id. ¶ 101 (citation omitted).
179. Id. ¶ 118.
180. Id. ¶¶ 166–71.
181. App. Nos. 15339/02, 21166/02, 20058/02, 11673/02 & 15343/02 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
Mar. 20, 2008).
182. Id. ¶¶ 20–25, 29, 48, 54–55.
183. Id. ¶ 117.
184. Id.
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effective deterrence against threats to the right to life.”185 This
obligation extends to any activity, whether public or private, that
places human life at risk.186 The Court then reaffirmed that the
positive obligation entails both substantive and procedural
elements.
The obligation on the part of the State to safeguard the lives of
those within its jurisdiction has been interpreted so as to
include both substantive and procedural aspects, notably a
positive obligation to take regulatory measures and to
adequately inform the public about any life-threatening
emergency, and to ensure that any occasion of the deaths
caused thereby would be followed by a judicial enquiry.187

Applying these principles, the Court found that Russia had
violated its substantive and procedural obligations to protect the
right to life.188 Specifically, Russia had failed to develop an
adequate warning system in the event of a disaster and had failed
to conduct an appropriate investigation after the mudslide had
occurred.189 Accordingly, the Court awarded the applicants 85,000
euros in damages.190
In the Osman-Öneryıldız-Budayeva line of cases, some of the
victims were clearly identified because they had already suffered
death. However, death is not required for an individual to bring a
claim or for a state to be in violation of Article 2. Potential victims
are also recognized under the European Convention.191 Because the
European Court recognizes a state’s obligation to prevent harms, it
185. Id. ¶ 129 (citations omitted).
186. Id. ¶ 130.
187. Id. ¶ 131 (citation omitted).
188. Id. ¶ 205.
189. Id. ¶¶ 153–55, 194.
190. Id. ¶ 205.
191. See, e.g., Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, App. Nos. 27996/06 &
34836/06, ¶ 28 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 22, 2009) (“It is reiterated that in order to be able
to lodge a petition by virtue of Article 34 of the Convention, a person, nongovernmental organisation or group of individuals must be able to claim to be the
victim of a violation of the rights set forth in the Convention. In order to claim to be
a victim of a violation, a person must be directly affected by the impugned measure.
The Convention does not, therefore, envisage the bringing of an actio popularis for
the interpretation of the rights set out therein or permit individuals to complain
about a provision of national law simply because they consider, without having been
directly affected by it, that it may contravene the Convention. It is, however, open
to applicants to contend that a law violates their rights, in the absence of an
individual measure of implementation, if they belong to a class of people who risk
being directly affected by the legislation or if they are required either to modify their
conduct or risk being prosecuted.”) (citations omitted). See also Burden v. United
Kingdom, App. No. 13378/05, ¶¶ 33–34 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr. 29, 2008) (citing to various
cases in which a party sought relief while facing the risk of suffering rights
violations).
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has accepted the admissibility of claims for Article 2 violations
brought before death has occurred.192 And, it has found violations
of Article 2 in such cases.193 Thus, states have an obligation to
prevent future harm to human life.194
In R.R. v. Hungary, for example, the European Court held that
Hungary violated the right to life norm in Article 2 by placing the
applicants at risk of death by removing them from a witness
protection program.195 While the applicants were fearful of
retaliation by a criminal organization, no one had yet been killed.
The Court reaffirmed that Article 2 requires each state “to
safeguard the lives of those individuals within its jurisdiction.”196
This obligation may require states “to take preventive operational
measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk from the
criminal acts of another individual.”197 The Court also reaffirmed
public authorities could be liable under Article 2 if they knew or
192. See infra 35–36 and notes 195–200.
193. Id.
194. A similar obligation exists with respect to Article 8’s protection of the right
to family life in the European Convention. In Taskin v. Turkey, for example, the
Court considered claims raising violations of Article 2 (right to life) as well as Article
8 (right to family life) of the European Convention. App. No. 46117/89 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
Nov. 10, 2004). In Taskin, Turkish authorities had approved the development of a
gold mine near several villages. Id. ¶ 17. The applicants, who lived near the gold
mine, argued that Turkey did not properly assess the inherent risks of approving the
project. Id. ¶¶ 23, 26. They also alleged the development and operation of the mine
would cause environmental harm and could have a negative impact on their health
and safety. Id. ¶¶ 13, 23. The Turkish government responded that these claims
were “hypothetical,” and there was no serious or imminent risk since the harms
“might materialise only in twenty to fifty years.” Id. ¶ 107. Moreover, the
“applicants could not point to any specific fact concerning an incident directly caused
by the gold mine in question.” Id. The European Court found that Article 8 was
applicable because it applies to “severe environmental pollution which may affect
individuals’ well-being and prevent them from enjoying their homes in such a way
as to affect their private and family life adversely.” Id. ¶ 113. Article 8 also addresses
situations in which “the dangerous effects of an activity to which the individuals
concerned are likely to be exposed have been determined as part of an environmental
impact assessment procedure in such a way as to establish a sufficiently close link
with private and family life.” Id. The Court determined that Turkey had failed to
comply with its procedural obligations under Article 8. Id. ¶ 126. Because it
determined that the Article 8 and 2 claims were related, the Court found it
unnecessary to find a specific violation of Article 2. Id. ¶¶ 139–40. See generally
Dinah Shelton, Legitimate and Necessary: Adjudicating Human Rights Violations
Related to Activities Causing Environmental Harm or Risk, 6 J. HUM. RTS. & ENV’T
139 (2015) (investigating the intersection of human rights and environmental
conditions); Svitlana Kravchenko & John E. Bonine, Interpretation of Human Rights
for the Protection of the Environment in the European Court of Human Rights, 25
GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 245 (2012) (advocating for broader incorporation of the
European Court’s environmental jurisprudence on a national scale).
195. App. No. 19400/11 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2012).
196. Id. ¶ 28.
197. Id.
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should have known about the existence of a real and immediate risk
to life and failed to take measures within their power that might
have reasonably avoided the risk.198
For the Court, and having regard to the nature of the right
protected by Article 2, a right fundamental in the scheme of the
Convention, it is sufficient for an applicant to show that the
authorities did not do all that could be reasonably expected of
them to avoid a real and immediate risk to life of which they
have or ought to have knowledge. This is a question which can
only be answered in the light of all the circumstances of any
particular case.199

For these reasons, the Court held that Hungary had violated the
right to life norm in Article 2 even though no one had died as a result
of the government’s acts or omissions. Accordingly, the Court
awarded the applicants 52,000 euros in damages.200
The European Court thus recognizes a state’s obligation to
redress harms that have already occurred as well as to prevent
harms that have yet to occur. “From whichever angle the state’s
positive obligations are approached, it is inescapable to conclude
that the quintessence of protection concerns the prevention of
human rights violations.”201 Accordingly, a state’s liability for
violating the right to life norm attaches even in the absence of
death.202 The state’s failure to take appropriate administrative
action that adequately protects potential victims from harm is itself
sufficient to establish liability.
c.

The Inter-American Court of Human Rights

The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has adopted a
similar approach to the positive obligation imposed on states to
protect human life.203 In fact, the Inter-American Court’s first
198. Id. ¶ 29.
199. Id. (citing Osman v. United Kingdom, App. No. 23452/94, 29 Eur. H.R. Rep.
245 (1998)).
200. Id. ¶¶ 44, 47.
201. XENOS, POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS, supra note 160, at 97 (emphasis in original).
202. See, e.g., Brincat v. Malta, App. Nos. 60908/11, 62110/11, 62129/11, 62312/11
& 62338/11, ¶ 82 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 24, 2014) (“The Court reiterates that it has
applied Article 2 both where an individual has died . . . and where there was a
serious risk of an ensuing death, even if the applicant was alive at the time of the
application.”) (citation omitted); Al Nashiri v. Poland, App. No. 28761/11 at 217 (Eur.
Ct. H.R. July 24, 2014) (holding Poland liable for violating Article 2 when it allowed
the CIA to transfer a detainee from its territory knowing there was a real and serious
risk that he would be subjected to the death penalty); Kolyadenko v. Russia, App.
Nos. 17423/05, 20534/05, 20678/05, 23263/05, 24283/05 & 35673/05 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
Feb. 28, 2012) (holding Russia liable for violating Article 2 when it released water
from a reservoir that placed the applicants at risk of death).
203. See generally Martin Nicolas Montoya Cespedes, The Inter-American Court

36

Law & Inequality

[Vol. 36: 1

judgment in Velàsquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras recognized that
states are under a positive obligation to protect human life pursuant
to Article 4 of the American Convention on Human Rights.204
According to the Court, this duty “includes all those means of a
legal, political, administrative and cultural nature that promote the
protection of human rights.”205
The Court’s subsequent
jurisprudence has significantly clarified and extended this
obligation.206
In Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, the InterAmerican Court considered whether Paraguay had violated the
right to life norm under Article 4 of the American Convention
through its treatment of the Yakye Axa indigenous group.207 The
of Human Rights’ Positive Obligations Doctrine, in THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE, PRESENT AND FUTURE 765 (Yves Haeck et
al. eds., 2015) [hereinafter THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS]
(describing how the judicial dialogue between the Inter-American Court and the
European Court works to broaden human rights); Steven R. Keener & Javier
Vasquez, A Life Worth Living: Enforcement of the Right to Health Through the Right
to Life in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
595 (2009) (explaining that the Inter-American Court recognizes additional positive
obligations on states to enforce the right to a dignified life); Tara J. Melish & Ana
Aliverti, Positive Obligations in the Inter-American Human Rights System, 15
INTERIGHTS BULL. 120 (2006) (broadly analyzing positive obligations
jurisprudence).
204. Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 1, ¶ 188 (July 29, 1988). See
generally Laurens Lavrysen, Positive Obligations in the Jurisprudence of the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, 7 INTER-AM. & EUR. HUM. RTS. J. 94 (2014)
(highlighting the Inter-American Court as a leader in human rights developments
due to its positive obligations jurisprudence).
205. Velàsquez-Rodriguez, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 1, ¶ 175.
206. See Luna-Lopez v. Honduras, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 269 (Oct. 10, 2013) (holding Honduras responsible for
violations of the rights to life and personal integrity); Gonzalez v. Mexico (Cotton
Field), Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205 (Nov. 16, 2009) (finding Mexico accountable for its failure
to proactively protect applicants from patterns of gender-related violence); Pueblo
Bello Massacre v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 140 (Jan. 31, 2006) (requiring Colombia to proactively
recompense victims of rights violations, conduct investigations, and take
preventative measures).
207. Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
125 (June 17, 2005). See generally Scott McKenzie, Yakye Axa v. Paraguay:
Upholding and Framing the Human Right to Water, in THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT
OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 203, at 241 (highlighting the importance of this case
in shaping right-to-life jurisprudence). See also Villagrán-Morales v. Guatemala,
Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 77, ¶ 144 (Nov. 19, 1999) (“Owing
to the fundamental nature of the right to life, restrictive approaches to it are
inadmissible. In essence, the fundamental right to life includes, not only the right
of every human being not to be deprived of his life arbitrarily, but also the right that
he will not be prevented from having access to the conditions that guarantee a
dignified existence. States have the obligation to guarantee the creation of the
conditions required in order that violations of this basic right do not occur and, in
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petitioners alleged Paraguay had failed to protect their land rights,
which had forced them to live in poverty and without access to
public health care or natural resources, including clean water.208
They also attributed the deaths of several community members to
Paraguay’s inaction. In response, Paraguay asserted that it had
provided adequate resources to the Yakye Axa indigenous group
and, in any event, there was “no causal relationship ‘between the
land and physical survival’ and the alleged lack of preservation of
the right to life.”209 Paraguay also rejected liability for the
individual deaths “unless there is proof of negligence in dealing with
those specific cases by the public health authorities or by other
authorities who were aware of the facts.”210
In its opinion, the Court acknowledged the significance of the
right to life norm and the expansive nature of this right under
Article 4 of the American Convention.
Due to the basic nature of this right, approaches that restrict
the right to life are not admissible. Essentially, this right
includes not only the right of every human being not to be
arbitrarily deprived of his life, but also the right that conditions
that impede or obstruct access to a decent existence should not
be generated.211

The Court then identified the positive obligation of states to protect
the right to life.
One of the obligations that the State must inescapably
undertake as guarantor, to protect and ensure the right to life,
is that of generating minimum living conditions that are
compatible with the dignity of the human person and of not
creating conditions that hinder or impede it. In this regard, the
State has the duty to take positive, concrete measures geared
toward fulfillment of the right to a decent life, especially in the
case of persons who are vulnerable and at risk, whose care
becomes a high priority.212

To establish Paraguay’s liability in this case, the Court
indicated it “must establish whether the State generated conditions
that worsened the difficulties of access to a decent life for the
members of the Yakye Axa Community and whether, in that
context, it took appropriate positive measures to fulfill that
obligation.”213 After reviewing Paraguay’s treatment of the Yakye

particular, the duty to prevent its agents from violating it.”).
208. Yakye Axa, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶ 2.
209. Id. ¶ 159(f).
210. Id. ¶ 159(a).
211. Id. ¶ 161.
212. Id. ¶ 162 (footnote omitted).
213. Id. ¶ 163.
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Axa, the Court concluded that Paraguay had failed to comply with
its obligation, “to the detriment of the members of the Yakye Axa
Community, [by] not taking measures regarding the conditions that
affected their possibility of having a decent life.”214 Accordingly, the
Court found that Paraguay violated the right to life norm under
Article 4. The Court ordered Paraguay to transfer ownership of the
disputed territory to the petitioners and to take other action to
remedy the underlying violations.215
While the Inter-American Court found Paraguay in violation
of Article 4 in light of its overall treatment of the Yakye Axa
Community, it declined to find Paraguay responsible for the deaths
of sixteen members of the group. The petitioners had alleged that
these deaths “could have been avoided with adequate food and
medical care, and [the deaths were] a consequence of the lack of an
appropriate and timely response by the State to the Community’s
claim to its ancestral land.”216 In response, the Court noted that it
did “not have sufficient evidence to establish the causes of said
deaths.”217 This portion of the Court’s judgment was subject to
several dissenting opinions. Judge Abreu Burelli criticized the
majority for the manner in which it considered the evidence
surrounding the sixteen deaths.
Because the Yakye Axa
Community lacked basic services, including drinking water, it was
“not difficult to infer that the death of children, among
others . . . were due to their precarious living conditions.”218
Similarly, Judges Cançado Trindade and Ventura Robles argued
that the causal link sought by the majority “is clearly established
by lack of due diligence by the State regarding the living conditions
of all members of the Yakye Axa Community (objective
international responsibility of the State).”219 Given the significance
of the right to life norm, Judges Cançado Trindade and Ventura
Robles felt the Court should have engaged in a more thoughtful
analysis regarding the individual deaths.220 And, they called for the

214. Id. ¶ 176.
215. Id. ¶ 242.
216. Id. ¶ 177.
217. Id.
218. Id. ¶ 13 (Abreu Burelli, J., partially dissenting opinion).
219. Id. ¶ 11 (Cançado Trindade & Ventura Robles, JJ., separate dissenting
opinion) (emphasis omitted).
220. Because there were doubts regarding the cause of death, Judges Cançado
Trindade and Ventura Robles felt that only ten of the sixteen deaths could properly
be attributed to Paraguay. Id. ¶ 8.
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Court “to correct, as soon as possible, the regression that . . . the
instant Judgment constitutes.”221
One year after the Inter-American Court’s ruling in Yakye
Axa, it revisited the issue of state responsibility for violations of the
right to life norm under Article 4 of the American Convention in
Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay.222 The claims
raised were similar to those in Yakye Axa.223 The petitioners alleged
Paraguay had failed to protect their land rights, thereby
threatening the existence of the community and the health of its
members. 224 They also alleged that Paraguay was responsible for
the deaths of several community members.225 Paraguay rejected
these claims. It argued that public health services were available
to all citizens, including the petitioners. 226 Accordingly, community
members must accept a degree of personal responsibility for their
own well-being. 227
In addition, the community itself was
responsible for any harms that may have occurred to its
members.228 Paraguay also rejected responsibility for any deaths
due to natural causes “unless it be proved that there has been
negligence to address these particular cases by the health care
authorities or by other authorities with knowledge of the facts.”229
In its decision, the Court restated that the right to life norm
creates both negative and positive obligations.230 It also reaffirmed
the primacy of the right to life norm.
[T]he States must adopt any measures that may be necessary
to create an adequate statutory framework to discourage any
threat to the right to life; to establish an effective system of
administration of justice able to investigate, punish, and repair
any deprivation of lives by state agents, or by individuals; and
to protect the right of not being prevented from access to
conditions that may guarantee a decent life, which entails the
adoption of positive measures to prevent the breach of such
right.231

221. Id. ¶ 23.
222. See Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 146 (Mar. 29, 2006).
223. Id. ¶ 2.
224. Id. ¶ 146.
225. Id.
226. Id. ¶ 147(a).
227. Id. ¶ 147(b), (d).
228. Id.
229. Id. ¶ 147(e).
230. Id. ¶ 152.
231. Id. ¶ 153 (footnotes omitted).
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It then added a significant clarification regarding the responsibility
of states.
It is clear for the Court that a State cannot be responsible for
all situations in which the right to life is at risk. Taking into
account the difficulties involved in the planning and adoption
of public policies and the operative choices that have to be made
in view of the priorities and the resources available, the positive
obligations of the State must be interpreted so that an
impossible or disproportionate burden is not imposed upon the
authorities.232

To determine state liability arising out of the positive
obligation to protect the right to life, the Court identified a two-part
test, citing the European Court’s decisions in Osman and
Öneryıldız.233 First, “it must be determined that at the moment of
the occurrence of the events, the authorities knew or should have
known about the existence of a situation posing an immediate and
certain risk to the life of an individual or of a group of
individuals.”234 Second, it must also be determined “that the
necessary measures were not adopted within the scope of their
authority which could be reasonably expected to prevent or avoid
such risk.”235 Applying these principles, the Court found that
Paraguay had “full knowledge about the actual risk and
vulnerability situation to which the members of the Sawhoyamaxa
Community [were] exposed, especially children, pregnant women
and the elderly, and also about their mortality rates.”236 Despite
this knowledge, Paraguay had failed to adopt necessary measures
to address these risks. Thus, Paraguay had violated the right to life
norm because it had “not adopted the necessary positive measures
within its powers, which could reasonably be expected to prevent or
avoid risking the right to life of the members of the Sawhoyamaxa
Community.”237
The Court’s decision made clear that the
immediacy and certainty of a risk does not refer to temporal
imminence but rather to foreseeability.
In contrast to the Yakye Axa opinion, the Court also found
Paraguay responsible for the deaths of nineteen community
members. The Court noted that “most of the Community members
that died were boys and girls under 3 years of age,” who died from
reasonably foreseeable diseases that could have been prevented and
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Id. ¶ 155.
Id.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. ¶ 159.
Id. ¶ 178.
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treated at low cost.238 The Court indicated that these deaths were
attributable to Paraguay owing to “the lack of adequate prevention
and to the failure by the State to adopt sufficient positive measures,
considering that the State had knowledge of the situation of the
Community and that action by the State could be reasonably
expected.”239 The Court rejected Paraguay’s arguments that these
individuals shared responsibility for their illnesses by not seeking
appropriate treatment.
The Court found such arguments
incompatible with the object and purpose of the American
Convention.240 In their concurring opinions, Judges Cançado
Trindade and Ventura Robles applauded the Court for reversing the
narrow evidentiary approach it had used in Yakye Axa to deny state
liability for individual deaths.241 Indeed, Judge Cançado Trindade
argued that imposing a higher evidentiary standard on an
“ostensibly weaker party, wanting the means for surviving with a
minimum of dignity” would constitute a probatio diabolica that is
wholly inappropriate in human rights law.242
Like the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, the
Inter-American Court has taken a broad approach to claims by
potential victims of future harm to human life.243 The InterAmerican Court has accepted the admissibility of claims for Article
4 violations brought before death has occurred. And, it has found
Article 4 violations in such cases.244
In Hilaire v. Trinidad and Tobago, for example, the InterAmerican Court considered whether Trinidad and Tobago violated
the right to life norm by sentencing thirty-two detainees to death
238. Id. ¶ 171.
239. Id. ¶ 172. However, the Court did not attribute responsibility to Paraguay
for the death of a child from a rare blood disorder. Id. The Court also declined to
hold Paraguay responsible for a death attributed to murder, three deaths attributed
to work and traffic accidents, and the deaths of three adults caused by pneumonia
and tuberculosis. Id. ¶¶ 179–80. According to the Court, these deaths could not be
attributable to Paraguay.
240. Id. ¶ 173.
241. Id. ¶ 15 (Ventura Robles, J., separate opinion) (“By entering an unanimous
judgment in the case of the Sawhoyamaxa Community, the Inter-American Court
rectified a judgment—Case of the Indigenous Community Yakye Axa—in which a
restrictive interpretation of the right to life had prevailed, and returned to the path,
taken in previous judgments, specifically in the Case of the Street Children, in which
a broad interpretation of human rights violations, especially the breach of the right
to life, had at all times guided the Court’s decisions. And this should have always
been the case.”) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original); id. ¶¶ 1–12 (Cançado
Trindade, J., separate opinion).
242. Id. ¶ 20 (Cançado Trindade, J., separate opinion).
243. JO M. PASQUALUCCI, THE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTERAMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 252 (2d ed. 2013).
244. Id.
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pursuant to a mandatory death penalty statute.245 The statute
offered defendants no opportunity to argue for a lesser sentence.246
Significantly, the detainees in this case had not yet been executed.
Nonetheless, they claimed a violation of Article 4 of the American
Convention. The Inter-American Court agreed, holding that
Trinidad and Tobago had violated Article 4 through its use of the
mandatory death sentence statute.247 In his concurring opinion,
Judge Garcia Ramirez addressed the applicability of the right to life
norm in cases where death has not yet occurred.248
Evidently, there may be a violation of the right to life even
whilst the victims have not yet been deprived of theirs. The
right to life—like any other right—can be viewed as affected in
an iter that moves through various stages, named and
identified, all of which, by a common design conferred by nature
and sense terminate the life of an individual. The last phase in
this iter culminates in the deprivation of the life itself, object of
the maximum affection of this right. Before, there may be other
moments: all of which, in conformance with the circumstances,
aspire and lead to this end. Such is the case of a general norm
that runs contrary to the American Convention (or to the State
Constitution, where domestic issues are at stake): the norm
may be challenged on jurisdictional grounds before its
implementation produces consequences which may give rise to
a concrete case.249

Finally, the Inter-American Court offers any “person or group
of persons, or any nongovernmental entity” the right to file a
petition alleging human rights violations.250 Significantly, such
individuals, groups, or entities need not be victims or even potential
victims.251 They are essentially granted the right to file an actio
popularis, which serves as a claim on behalf of others.252 The ability
to file petitions in such a manner broadens the protective scope of
the Inter-American system and reflects the flexible nature of
human rights law, particularly in cases involving human life.

245. See Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 94 (June 21, 2002).
246. Id. ¶ 88.
247. Id. ¶¶ 108–09.
248. See id. (Garcia Ramirez, J., concurring).
249. Id. ¶ 6 (emphasis in original).
250. American Convention, supra note 117, art. 44.
251. PASQUALUCCI, supra note 243, at 100; LAURENCE BURGORGUE-LARSEN &
AMAYA UBEDA DE TORRES, THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: CASE
LAW AND COMMENTARY 110–17 (2011).
252. See William J. Aceves, Actio Popularis? The Class Action in International
Law, 2003 U. CHI. L.F. 353 (2003); Alfred Rubin, Actio Popularis, Jus Cogens and
Offenses Erga Omnes?, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 265 (2001).
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d. Summarizing the Right to Life Test
The right to life norm imposes a positive obligation on states
to protect human life. The preceding review of international
practice and case law offers the foundation for a three-part test to
determine whether a state has complied with this obligation in a
manner consistent with human rights law.253 This test represents
an extension of the principles first enunciated in Osman and
Velàsquez-Rodriguez and reflects the growing significance of the
positive obligation to protect human life. Each element is necessary
to implicate state responsibility.
First, is there a risk to human life? This risk can emanate
from human or natural causes.254 It can arise from public or private
action. And, the risk need not target a specific person. It can
involve a risk to members of a larger group or even the general
public.255 The risk must be real and immediate, but this simply
means the harm can occur at any time.256 Thus, the risk does not
require temporal imminence, meaning the harm is not required to
253. Cf. Keener & Vasquez, supra note 203, at 619 (proposing a three-part test for
examining whether a state’s approach for addressing public health matters violates
the right to life); Ebert & Sijniensky, supra note 126, at 366 (proposing a similar test
for examining whether a state’s approach for addressing structural risks violates the
right to life); Lauta & Rytter, supra note 168, at 124 (proposing a test that examines
the foreseeability, gravity, and mitigability to determine state responsibility for
disasters and threats to human life).
254. Lauta & Rytter, supra note 168, at 113.
255. Ebert & Sijniensky, supra note 126, at 360–362.
256. XENOS, POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS, supra note 160, at 111–112. Cf. Valiuliene
v. Lithuania, App. No. 33234/07, (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 26, 2013) (Pinto de
Albuquerque, J., concurring) (“One of the most problematic aspects of the State’s
positive obligation is the definition of the exact ambit of its duty to prevent and
protect. The Court has developed the so-called Osman test, which normally assesses
if the authorities knew, or ought to have known at the time, of the existence of real
and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual or individuals from the
criminal acts of a third party and they failed to take measures within the scope of
their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk.
Put simply, the State answers for the wrongful conduct of non-State actors when
their conduct was foreseeable and avoidable by the exercise of State powers. The
heart of the dispute in the current case lies in the adequateness of this standard to
the particular situation of domestic violence. Realistically speaking, at the stage of
an ‘immediate risk’ to the victim it is often too late for the State to intervene. In
addition, the recurrence and escalation inherent in most cases of domestic violence
makes it somehow artificial, even deleterious, to require an immediacy of the risk.
Even though the risk might not be imminent, it is already a serious risk when it is
present . . . . If a State knows or ought to know that a segment of its population, such
as women, is subject to repeated violence and fails to prevent harm from befalling
the members of that group of people when they face a present (but not yet imminent)
risk, the State can be found responsible by omission for the resulting human rights
violations. The constructive anticipated duty to prevent and protect is the reverse
side of the context of widespread abuse and violence already known to the State
authorities.”) (emphasis omitted).
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occur within specified days, weeks, or even months.257 To hold
otherwise would undermine the strength of the obligation to protect
human life. Significantly, human rights law does not require a risk
to be fully realized or for the harm to have already occurred. States
are obligated to prevent harm from occurring to potential victims.258
Indeed, the prevention of human rights violations should always be
preferred over remedial action taken after such harms have
occurred. Thus, states can be held responsible for acts or omissions
that place human life at risk.
Second, did the state know or should it have known about the
risk to life? Knowledge of any government official, whether
national, regional, or local, is attributable to the state and is,
therefore, sufficient to establish responsibility.259 Unlike most
negative obligations that maintain a heightened mens rea standard,
positive obligations only require actual or implied knowledge of the
risk. The state must be aware of the risk. If the state is unaware,
it will still be responsible if it should have known about the risk. As
part of this analysis, the foreseeability of the risk must be
considered.260 On some occasions, this may involve assessing the
probability that a risk will materialize.261 On other occasions,
foreseeability may be established by identifying a causal link
between the state’s acts or omissions and the risk to human life.262
“It is an ex post test of ‘foreseeability’ of the event: even if the event
was predictable, there is still room, even after the wrongful event
occurred, for verifying its place in the chain of events.”263
Third, did the state take or could it have taken reasonable
measures within its means and authority to reduce or prevent the

257. Ebert & Sijniensky, supra note 126, at 358–360.
258. See BERTRAND G. RAMCHARAN, PREVENTIVE HUMAN RIGHTS STRATEGIES
(2010); THE PREVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS (Christiane BourloyannisVrailas & Linos-Alexander Sicilianos eds., 2001).
259. This approach to attribution of conduct is consistent with the work of the
International Law Commission regarding state responsibility.
See JAMES
CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON STATE
RESPONSIBILITY 94–99 (2002).
260. See Kiliç v. Turkey, App. No. 22492/93 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 28, 2000); see also
Benedetto Conforti, Exploring the Strasbourg Case-Law: Reflections on State
Responsibility for the Breach of Positive Obligations, in ISSUES OF STATE
RESPONSIBILITY BEFORE INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS 129 (Malgosia
Fitzmaurice & Dan Sarooshi eds., 2004) (explaining a state’s obligations to prevent
certain human rights violations).
261. Lauta & Rytter, supra note 168, at 124–125.
262. See Conforti, supra note 260, at 132–135; see also LCB v. United Kingdom,
App. No. 23413/94, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 212, 228–29 (1998).
263. Conforti, supra note 260, at 135.
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risk to life?264 This element requires a fact-intensive analysis and
contains several considerations.265 Does the state have the
resources to act? What is the nexus between the state’s acts or
omissions and the risk to life?266 And, could state action have a real
prospect of altering the outcome or mitigating the harm to human
life? In this analysis, states are not assessed under a strict liability
standard. Rather, state behavior is assessed under a due diligence
standard wherein states exert their best possible efforts to minimize
the risk to life.267 Also, states are not obligated to act without
considering the financial and societal costs of such action.268
Human rights law does not require states to meet impossible
standards or accept unreasonable burdens.269 And, states cannot
reasonably act against every conceivable risk to life as some risks
are simply unavoidable.270 In fact, states are granted a wide margin
of appreciation in making administrative and budgetary
decisions.271 States have a right to prioritize public programs and
264. Keener & Vasquez, supra note 203, at 619.
265. Id. at 620.
266. There is no common rule for establishing causality and various formulations
have been used. See CRAWFORD, supra note 259, at 203–205; Ilias Plakokefalos,
Causation in the Law of State Responsibility and the Problem of Overdetermination:
In Search of Clarity, 26 EUR. J. INT’L L. 471, 476–86 (2015); PRINCIPLES OF SHARED
RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 129–30 (Andre Nollkaemper & Ilias
Plakokefalos eds., 2014); Michael Strauss, Causation as an Element of State
Responsibility, 16 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 893, 897 (1984). However, causality need
not be established to a legal certainty, nor is a high evidentiary standard required to
establish causality. See id. at 893–97. In fact, such a requirement would be contrary
to the basic principles of human rights law.
267. This approach is consistent with international law. See Pulp Mills on the
River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 14, ¶101 (Apr. 20); see also Jan
Arno Hessbruegge, The Historical Development of the Doctrines of Attribution and
Due Diligence in International Law, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 265, 268–75 (2004)
(explaining that states may be held responsible for not exercising due diligence to
prevent acts by non-state actors); CRAWFORD, supra note 259, at 140 (“Obligations of
prevention are usually construed as best efforts obligations, requiring States to take
all reasonable or necessary measures to prevent a given event from occurring, but
without warranting that the event will not occur.”).
268. RADHIKA BALAKRISHNAN ET AL., CTR. FOR WOMEN’S GLOB. LEADERSHIP,
MAXIMUM AVAILABLE RESOURCES & HUMAN RIGHTS: ANALYTICAL REPORT 2–4
(2011).
269. Lauta & Rytter, supra note 168, at 118.
270. Id. at 126.
271. Such an approach is consistent with existing international practice regarding
the provision of economic, social, and cultural rights, which must be provided by
states “to the maximum of [their] available resources.” International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 2(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. See
ANN BLYBERG & HELENA HOFBAUER, ARTICLE 2 AND GOVERNMENTS’ BUDGETS 6–9
(2014); BALAKRISHNAN ET AL., supra note 268, at 6; Eitan Felner, Closing the “Escape
Hatch”: A Toolkit to Monitor the Progressive Realization of Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights, 1 J. HUM. RTS. PRAC. 402, 404 (2009). See also XENOS, POSITIVE
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government spending.272
But while resource allocation
considerations may be relevant, they are “not a blanket excuse for
the state failing to intervene to save a life and the courts should
investigate the specific circumstances prevailing in each case.”273 In
assessing the reasonableness of state action, courts will balance the
interests of potential victims with the needs, abilities, and resources
of the state.274 Various factors will also be considered, including the
number of potential victims, the probability of harm, and the costs
of state action.275 Thus, the failure of a state to take reasonable
measures in light of such considerations “is sufficient to engage the
responsibility of the State.”276
In sum, human rights law requires a careful analysis of the
decision-making process and the rationale for a state’s acts or
omissions that threaten human life. Such analysis requires full
transparency of the state’s decision-making process.277 Only

OBLIGATIONS, supra note 160, at 106 (“The scope of positive obligations . . . relates
to a content of protection that can realistically be secured by the state’s resources.”).
Cf. Responsibilities and Obligations of States, Sponsoring Persons and Entities with
Respect to Activities in the Area, Advisory Op. of Feb. 1, 2011, ITLOS Rep. 2011, ¶
242(5),
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_17/adv_op_
010211.pdf (advising that nations must establish budgetary and administrative
regulations but that “[t]he scope and extent of these laws and regulations and
administrative measures depends on the legal system of the sponsoring State”). But
see Kenneth Roth, Defending Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Practical Issues
Faced by an International Human Rights Organization, 26 HUM. RTS. Q. 63 (2004)
(outlining the practical problems of enforcing economic, social, and cultural rights
when states have budgetary and administrative discretion).
272. See WICKS, CONFLICTING INTERESTS, supra note 114, at 217.
273. Id. at 237.
274. See Mathias Klatt, Positive Obligations Under the European Convention on
Human Rights, 71 HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 691, 694 (2011); see also JONAS
CHRISTOFFERSEN, FAIR BALANCE: PROPORTIONALITY, SUBSIDIARITY AND PRIMARITY
IN THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 94–111 (2009); Ebert &
Sijniensky, supra note 126, at 344 (“The challenge is, hence, to define the State’s
positive obligations in a way that—while ensuring legal certainty—is attuned to the
relevant scenario and strikes a fair balance between the interests of the individual
and those of the society at large, also given the potentially far-reaching consequences
for policy-making and public budgets.”).
275. See WICKS, CONFLICTING INTERESTS, supra note 114, at 237; Lauta & Rytter,
supra note 168, at 124.
276. O’Keeffe v. Ireland, App. No. 35810/09, ¶ 149 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 28, 2014);
see James Gallen, O’Keeffe v. Ireland: The Liability of States for Failure to Provide
an Effective System for the Detection and Prevention of Child Sexual Abuse in
Education, 78 MODERN L. REV. 151, 152 (2015).
277. See WICKS, CONFLICTING INTERESTS, supra note 114, at 233 (outlining
approaches to transparency); see also MARIE-BÉNÉDICTE DEMBOUR, WHO BELIEVES
IN HUMAN RIGHTS? REFLECTIONS ON THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION 89 (2006) (“The
impossibility of assigning a precise value to any of the considered elements makes
the method highly susceptible to a lack of transparency.”).
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through such case-by-case analysis can the liability of the state be
measured.278
III. The Valuing of Human Life
Every year, governments use cost-benefit analysis and value
of a statistical life (VSL) calculations to assess mortality risks and
make decisions that implicate human life.279 While regulatory
decisions are often less visible than other forms of government
action, they may still have a profound impact on mortality risks.280
Regulatory decisions on matters pertaining to environmental
standards, food quality, labor protection, and transportation safety
affect human life on a daily basis.281 Decisions regarding disease
prevention, disaster preparation, and climate change can have even
broader consequences on human life.282 Using cost-benefit analysis
and VSL calculations to determine mortality risks in these
regulatory fields can readily implicate the right to life norm.283
Reviewing cost-benefit analysis through the lens of human rights
law raises both methodological and normative concerns.284
a. The Methodological Flaws of Cost-Benefit Analysis and
VSL Calculations
One problem with using cost-benefit analysis to address
mortality risks is evidenced by the wide range of VSL calculations,
which currently vary from $1 million to $10 million in the United

278. While the three-part right to life test shares some features with traditional
tort law, human rights law and tort law pursue distinct societal goals. See Donal
Nolan, Negligence and Human Rights Law: The Case for Separate Development, 76
MODERN L. REV. 286, 287–88 (2013); François du Bois, Human Rights and Tort
Liability of Public Authorities, 127 L.Q. Rev. 589, 590 (2011). Simply stated, human
rights law is public law, whereas tort law is private law. See Nolan, supra note 278.
Thus, principles of tort law can inform the development of human rights law, but
they do not apply in proceedings before human rights bodies. See id.; du Bois, supra
278, at 600.
279. SUNSTEIN, VALUING LIFE, supra note 14, at 2–3.
280. Id. at 4.
281. Id. at 3.
282. See, e.g., Budayeva v. Russia, App. Nos. 15339/02, 21166/02, 20058/02,
11673/02 & 15343/02, ¶¶ 13–38 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Mar. 20, 2008) (serving as an example
of an international law case concerning a natural disaster); Lauta & Rytter, supra
note 168, at 116–117 (outlining the application of the right to life in Budayeva).
283. See Lauta & Rytter, supra note 168, at 118.
284. See, e.g., I. Glenn Cohen, Identified Versus Statistical Lives in US Civil
Litigation, in IDENTIFIED VERSUS STATISTICAL LIVES, supra note 18, at 43–76
(discussing the ethical concerns of the statistical method of valuing life and the
difficulty in determining how to use “identified” versus “statistical” victims in policy
development).
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States.285 When governments use a low VSL in cost-benefit
analysis, they make it less likely that proposed regulations will be
found cost-effective.286 As a result, it is less likely that the proposed
regulations will be adopted. In contrast, a high VSL will likely
justify more expensive regulatory action and, presumably, a greater
reduction in mortality risks.287 “Higher value of statistical life
(VSL) amounts increase the assessed benefits of government
regulations, making more stringent regulations desirable on an
economic basis, and lower VSL amounts have the opposite effect.”288
When these decisions involve public safety, they implicate the right
to life norm. Should states have an obligation to use the highest
recognized VSL calculation when addressing mortality risks? To do
otherwise is to increase the likelihood that regulatory action will
not protect some individuals from loss of life.289
In 2005, for example, the Bush administration considered a
proposed rule that would require car manufacturers to increase the
strength of automobile roofs.290 By strengthening the roofs,
passengers would be more likely to survive rollover accidents.291 In
its regulatory impact assessment, the U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT) considered two rule options.292 The first
option would require vehicles to pass a load resistance test of 2.5
times the vehicle weight, which would prevent between 13 to 44
fatalities (and from 498 to 793 nonfatal injuries) per year.293 The
second option would require vehicles to pass a load resistance test
of 3.0 times the vehicle weight, which would prevent between 49 to
135 fatalities (and from 1,540 to 2,151 nonfatal injuries) per year.294
In a subsequent Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the DOT used a
$3.4 million VSL and selected the less stringent rule that would
prevent up to 44 fatalities.295 In 2009, the Obama administration
reconsidered the rule. This time, the DOT used a VSL of $6.1
285. Viscusi, Devaluation of Life, supra note 74, at 107.
286. Id. at 103.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. SUNSTEIN, VALUING LIFE, supra note 14, at 50 (demonstrating that using a
lower VSL makes it more likely that the costs of a proposed regulation do not exceed
its benefits, thereby failing to protect the lives it was designed to safeguard).
290. See Copeland, supra note 71, at 20; Binyamin Appelbaum, A Life’s Value? It
May Depend on the Agency, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2011, at A1; see also Ted Mann, Rail
Safety and the Value of a Life, WALL ST. J., June 18, 2013, at A1.
291. COPELAND, supra note 71, at 20; Appelbaum, supra note 290.
292. FMVSS 216, UPGRADE ROOF CRUSH RESISTANCE, supra note 23, at 2.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id.
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million in its analysis.296 It determined that the rule would prevent
135 fatalities and 1,065 nonfatal injuries.297 With the revised VSL
calculation, the proposed rule was deemed cost-effective and
thereafter approved.298
In this example, the Bush administration rule was expected to
prevent 44 deaths each year. But, the Bush administration could
have prevented an additional 91 deaths per year if it had adopted
the more stringent rule. In other words, the Bush administration
adopted a regulatory policy it knew would provide only limited
protection to consumers even though the VSL literature supported
a higher valuation.299 If the right to life norm was limited to
negative obligations, the decision to accept 91 additional deaths
each year might not violate human rights law. But, because the
right to life norm also imposes positive obligations, the adoption of
the original rule by the Bush administration could give rise to a
violation, particularly when the academic research supported the
higher VSL calculation.
Such criticisms against cost-benefit analysis and VSL
calculations gain greater traction when the underlying decisions
are found to be influenced by exogenous factors.300
Clearly the value of American drivers’ lives did not magically
jump by 75% in the span of four years, but both VSLs are within
the span of estimates supported by academic literature. So, did
the choice of VSL affect the policy choice, or did the policy choice
affect the VSL used?301

It is evident political interests can influence VSL
calculations.302 “[I]t is hard to escape the conclusion that few
296. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, Roof Crush Resistance, 49 C.F.R.
pts. 571 & 585 (proposed Apr. 30, 2009).
297. Id.
298. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, Roof Crush Resistance, PhaseIn Reporting Requirements, 74 Fed. Reg. 22,348, 22,348, 22,377–79 (May 12, 2009);
see also Appelbaum, supra note 290, at A1.
299. While a VSL of $3.5 million was used, the Preliminary Regulatory Impact
Analysis recognized “that higher values may be justified.” FMVSS 216, UPGRADE
ROOF CRUSH RESISTANCE, supra note 23, at VII-B.
300. See, e.g., Seth Borenstein, An American Life Worth Less Today, USA TODAY
(July
11,
2008),
https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-07-10796349025_x.htm (“It’s hard to imagine that it has other than a political
motivation.”).
301. CHRISTOPHER STOMBERG, POLICY PRIORITIES AND THE VALUE OF LIFE 9 (Oct.
2011) https://www.bateswhite.com/assets/htmldocuments/media.482.pdf; see also
SUNSTEIN, VALUING LIFE, supra note 14, at 85 (“If cost-benefit analysis is the basis
for the ultimate decision to approve or reject a proposed regulation, a lot may turn
on the selected VSL.”).
302. See Donald Kenkel, Using Estimates of the Value of a Statistical Life in
Evaluating Regulatory Effects, in VALUING THE HEALTH BENEFITS OF FOOD SAFETY:
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decisions about life-saving regulations are being made primarily
based on benefits and costs. These so-called ‘haphazard’ decisions
may reflect other systematic influences, such as political
pressure.”303 In the United States, regulatory impact assessments
must be reviewed and approved by the OIRA Administrator, who is
a presidential appointee.304 Organizational incentives may also
influence VSL calculations.305
Hence, the overall incentive for a regulatory agency to expand
its role with little cost to itself is not inconsistent with the
consistent use of a higher estimate of VSL . . . . In contrast to
agencies that are primarily regulatory, many government
agencies that need to fund programs directly out of limited
budgets might have a different incentive.306

The legitimacy of regulatory decisions is undermined when political
and organizational factors influence the cost-benefit analysis.
Regulatory decisions that are implemented in such a manner
and which lead to greater mortality risks may violate human rights
law.307 In these cases, there is a risk to human life. This risk is real
and immediate. The state knows about the risk to life; it is
foreseeable.
Indeed, the state’s own cost-benefit analysis
establishes acceptable mortality risks.308 If the state fails to adopt
measures within its means and authority that could reasonably be
expected to reduce or eliminate this risk, it will violate human

A PROCEEDINGS 2, 7 (Fred Kuchler ed., 2001); THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING
RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY
156 (1991); David M. Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, 77 U. COLO. L. REV.
335 (2006) (discussing whether cost-benefit analysis is truly a neutral method);
Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33
STAN. L. REV. 387, 443 (1981); Douglas A. Kysar, Politics by Other Meanings: A
Comment on “Retaking Rationality Two Years Later”, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 43, 47 (2011).
303. Kenkel, supra note 302, at 7. See also SUNSTEIN, VALUING LIFE, supra note
14, at 42–45.
304. Office of Info. & Reg. Affs. Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/Utilities/faq.jsp (last accessed Nov. 25, 2017).
305. STOMBERG, supra note 301, at 10; see also Marion Fourcade, The Political
Valuation of Life, 3 REG. & GOVERNANCE 291, 295 (2009) (“[T]he differences might
also reflect the different play of interests in those agencies, and different
configurations of power and organization among the targeted populations.”). But see
Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and
Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1868 (2013) (stating that the outcome of an
agency’s cost-benefit-analysis “depends on discussions that are substantive and often
highly technical”).
306. STOMBERG, supra note 301, at 10.
307. Cf. MCGARITY supra note 302, at 275–277 (discussing the political shift in
regulation of carcinogens by OIRA from the Carter to Reagan administrations);
WICKS, CONFLICTING INTERESTS, supra note 114, at 236–237.
308. Fourcade, supra note 305, at 291–292.
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rights law.309 This is not meant to suggest that governments must
reduce every risk or prevent every fatality. Moreover, this does not
suggest that cost-benefit analysis or VSL calculations may never be
used by governments in the decision-making process. Rather,
human rights law requires critical analysis of regulatory decisions
to determine whether they comply with the positive obligation to
protect human life.310 Have all the costs and benefits been
quantified and monetized? Which VSL calculation was used? Why
was it selected? Could a higher VSL calculation, which is
recognized in academic research, have been used to reduce
mortality risks? If so, why was the higher VSL not selected? Have
political or organizational factors unduly influenced the analysis?
Such questions are necessary for determining whether the state’s
cost-benefit analysis is reasonable or a violation of the right to life
norm. For these reasons, transparency in the decision-making
process is essential for assessing the legitimacy of state action.
In cases of competing VSL calculations, the precautionary
principle may offer an appropriate solution to valuation disparities.
In situations involving risks to human life, the precautionary
principle requires states to take action that minimizes such
potential risks.311
Pursuant to the precautionary principle,
differences in VSL calculations should be resolved by adopting the
higher valuation recognized in academic studies, thereby
maximizing protection against future harms, including loss of life.
Such an approach operates within the existing parameters of costbenefit analysis as well as the balancing tests identified in human
rights law.312 It recognizes that states have limited resources.313 It
acknowledges that states must make difficult decisions that
implicate human life.314 It also uses VSL calculations as part of

309. See WICKS, CONFLICTING INTERESTS, supra note 114, at 236.
310. Id. at 23. See generally id. at 223–36 (discussing the evaluation of allocating
resources and the procedural reasonableness of regulation).
311. See ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 12, at 224–229; THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 (David Freestone & Ellen
Hay eds., 1996) [hereinafter THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE]; Ling Chen, Realizing
the Precautionary Principle in Due Diligence, 25 DALHOUSIE J. LEG. STUD. 1, 4
(2016). But see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE (2005) (discussing the possibility that the precautionary principle
encourages too much regulation out of fear of the unknown).
312. See, e.g., Chen, supra note 311, at 10 (noting that the precautionary principle
“may convey a more compulsory meaning than the precautionary approach and
precautionary measures”).
313. THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supra note 311, at 12.
314. ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 12, at 224–229.

52

Law & Inequality

[Vol. 36: 1

cost-benefit analysis.315
However, it reduces the impact of
exogenous factors in the decision-making process by defaulting to
the higher VSL, thereby increasing the likelihood that life-saving
action will be undertaken and mortality risks reduced.316
To promote compliance with human rights law, regulatory
decisions that implicate human life should be removed from the
political process. At a minimum, the assessment of acceptable
mortality risks should not be subject to partisan influence.317
Currently, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA),
which reviews all regulatory impact assessments, operates within
the Executive Office of the President.318 It is headed by the OIRA
Administrator, a position appointed by the President and confirmed
by the Senate.319 To reduce partisanship in the regulatory process,
OIRA could be modeled after the Government Accountability Office
(GAO). The work of the GAO is shielded from partisan influence
through various mechanisms, including the selection process for its
leader.320 The President selects a nominee from a list prepared by
a bipartisan commission of congressional leaders.321 The nominee
is then submitted to the Senate for confirmation.322 A comparable
process could be established for the OIRA Administrator. In
addition, OIRA’s mandate could be revised to place greater priority
on reducing mortality risks. This could include an explicit
requirement to use higher VSL calculations whenever possible.
Through these revisions, OIRA could become more protective of
human life when it engages in cost-benefit analysis.

315. Id. at 117–22.
316. Id. at 227.
317. Cf. Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong
Way to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1986) (suggesting that the OMB
should be eliminated from the rule-making process); Sidney A. Shapiro, OMB and
the Politicization of Risk Assessment, 37 ENVTL. L. 1083 (2007) (criticizing the
politicization of the Office of Management and Budget and the lack of scientific basis
for its guideline establishment process); Rena Steinzor, The Case for Abolishing
Centralized White House Regulatory Review, 1 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 209
(2012) (criticizing partisan approaches to government regulatory schemes).
318. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ), OFFICE OF INFO. & REG. AFF.,
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/Utilities/faq.jsp (last accessed Nov. 25, 2017).
319. Id.
320. About GAO, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., https://www.gao.gov/about/
index.html (last accessed Nov. 25, 2017).
321. Id.
322. Id.
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b. The Normative Flaws of Cost-Benefit Analysis and VSL
Calculations
A more fundamental problem with cost-benefit analysis stems
from the very nature of human rights. Is it even possible to
meaningfully quantify or monetize life, dignity, or other human
rights?323 “Values like human life, health, nature, love, honor,
justice, or human rights are seen as absolute and inviolable—in
effect sacred.”324 Can such values be monetized?325 Such questions
have caused consternation and uncertainty within human rights
tribunals when they have been asked to consider remedies for loss
of life.326
What is the price of a human life? What is the price of the
integrity of the human person? What is the price of the liberty
of conscience, or of the protection of the honour and of the
dignity? What is the price of the human pain or suffering? If
the indemnizations are paid, would the “problem” be “resolved”?
What is certain is that all the rights protected under the
American Convention on Human Rights have an autonomous
value and a juridical content of their own, and moreover, are all
related inter se, indivisible as they are. As to the fundamental
right to life, I would go even further: its protection, which
requires positive measures on the part of the State, falls under
the domain of jus cogens, as acknowledged by contemporary
juridical doctrine.327

Because human rights are considered “sacred values,”
valuation efforts face significant challenges.328 At a minimum, costbenefit analysis will generate “strong negative feelings of distress

323. See, e.g., Martin Hanselmann & Carmen Tanner, Taboos and Conflicts in
Decision Making: Sacred Values, Decision Difficulty, and Emotions, 3 JUDGMENT &
DECISION MAKING 51, 52 (2008).
324. Id. at 52.
325. Even the word “value” is itself contested. See Editorial, Value, 4 LONDON
REV. INT’L L. 1, 1–3 (2016) (discussing the various legal uses and definitions of
“value”). See generally William J. Aceves, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Human Rights
(July 29, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (examining the
challenges associated with monetizing some costs and benefits while creating policy).
326. See, e.g., Villagrán-Morales v. Guatemala, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 177, at ¶ 36 (May 26, 2001) (Cançado Trindade, J., separate opinion)
(citations omitted).
327. Id.
328. Hanselmann & Tanner, supra note 323, at 52.
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and disturbance,” making valuation difficult.329 For these reasons,
it is simply not possible to quantify or monetize human rights.330
The challenges facing such valuation efforts are evident in the
Department of Justice’s (DOJ) 2012 regulatory impact assessment
for the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA). Congress adopted
PREA in 2003 to reduce sexual violence against detainees and
prisoners in U.S. detention facilities.331 To implement PREA, the
DOJ proposed a set of regulations and drafted a regulatory impact
assessment.332 While the PREA regulations did not directly address
mortality risks, their analysis highlights the problems with using
cost-benefit analysis to monetize the value of basic human rights.
To establish the benefits of the proposed regulations, the DOJ used
stated preference studies, including the “willingness to pay” and the
“willingness to accept” models.333 Under the “willingness to pay”
model, the DOJ monetized “the benefit of reducing the number of
prison rape victims by consulting studies that have estimated how
much society is willing to pay for the reduction of various crimes,
including rape, and assessing whether the conclusions of those
studies would be different in the specific context of prisons.”334
Under the “willingness to accept” model, the DOJ estimated “how
much the average victim of prison rape would be willing to accept
as compensation for injuries suffered in the assault, including
intangible injuries such as pain, suffering, and diminished quality
of life.”335 As part of its analysis, the DOJ examined different forms
of sexual misconduct (from nonconsensual sexual acts involving
injury or force to consensual contact) and monetized them.336 Using
329. Id. (citing Philip Tetlock, Thinking the Unthinkable: Sacred Values and
Taboo Cognitions, 7 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 320 (2003)), see also Philip Tetlock et
al., The Psychology of the Unthinkable: Taboo Trade-offs, Forbidden Base Rates, and
Heretical Counterfactuals, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 853 (2000) (exploring
“cognitive, affective, and behavioral responses to proscribed forms of social
cognition”).
330. See SURYA DEVA, REGULATING CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS:
HUMANIZING BUSINESS 141 (2012); Lisa Heinzerling, Quality Control: A Reply to
Professor Sunstein, 102 CAL. L. REV. 1457 (2014) [hereinafter Heinzerling, Quality
Control] (scrutinizing three possible approaches to the problem of non-quantifiability
in cost-benefit analysis); but see Cass R. Sunstein, The Limits of Quantification, 102
CAL. L. REV. 1369, 1375–79 (2014) (advocating that agencies use breakeven analysis
when quantification is impossible).
331. Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-79, § 3(6), 117 Stat. 972
[hereinafter PREA].
332. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR PREA
FINAL RULE (May 17, 2012).
333. Id. at 4.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 63.
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this cost-benefit methodology, the DOJ determined that “the total
monetizable benefit to society of eliminating all prison rape and
sexual abuse in the facilities covered by this regulation is at least
$52 billion annually.”337 The costs of implementing the PREA
standards were far lower.338 “We conclude that full nationwide
compliance with the PREA standards, in the aggregate, would cost
the correctional community approximately $6.9 billion over the
period of 2012–2026, or $468.5 million per year when annualized at
a 7% discount rate.”339 Breakeven analysis also supported the
proposed regulations by estimating that the PREA standards would
have to reduce “the annual number of prison sexual abuse victims
by about 1,671” for the costs to be justified.340 Under standard costbenefit analysis, therefore, the proposed regulations were costeffective.
While the PREA regulations were eventually adopted, the
DOJ’s analysis of sexual violence was subject to extensive
criticism.341 “In its 168-page Regulatory Impact Analysis, DOJ
treats the reader to a labored, distasteful, and gratuitous essay on
the economics of rape and sexual abuse.”342 To determine the
benefits of PREA, the DOJ had to monetize the value of
nonconsensual sexual assaults.343 To do so, it identified a list of
seventeen different forms of sexual assault and monetized each of
them using stated preference studies.344 Using the willingness to
pay and willingness to accept models, however, seems grossly
unsuitable in the context of sexual assault. “[R]ape is, by definition,
a crime of coercion, not consent, and thus the usual economic models
that depend on asking what individuals would freely pay to avoid a
337. Id. at 2.
338. Id. at 1.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 2.
341. See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, Cost-Benefit Jumps the Shark: The Department of
Justice’s Economic Analysis of Prison Rape, GEO. L. FAC. BLOG (June 13, 2012),
http://gulcfac.typepad.com/georgetown_university_law/2012/06/cost-benefit-jumpsthe-shark.html [hereinafter Heinzerling, Cost-Benefit] (critiquing the federal
government’s use of cost-benefit analysis in crafting law and policy on prison rape
and sexual abuse).
342. Id. Contra Rick Hills, In Defense of Cost-Benefit Analysis: Lessons from
Recent Rules for Preventing Prison Rape, PRAWFSBLAWG (June 16, 2012, 11:51 AM),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2012/06/in-defense-of-cost-benefitanalysis-lessons-from-recent-rules-for-preventing-prison-rape.html (“The problem
with the new prison rape elimination standards is not that the Obama
Administration indulged in too much CBA [cost-benefit analysis] but rather they did
not use CBA enough.”).
343. See generally Heinzerling, Cost-Benefit, supra note 341.
344. PREA, supra note 331, at 39–63.
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particular consequence do not fit.”345 The DOJ also used breakeven
analysis to monetize the physical and emotional abuse suffered by
victims of sexual assault.346 “In the topsy-turvy world of costbenefit analysis, DOJ was compelled to treat rape as just another
market exchange, coercion as a side note, and the elimination of
prison rape as a good idea only if the economic numbers happened
to come out that way.”347 Human Rights Watch conveyed similar
concerns to the DOJ when it released its own comments on the
proposed PREA regulations.348 “Estimating the monetary ‘costs’ of
crime is at best a fraught and imperfect effort, particularly when
dealing with crimes such as sexual abuse whose principal cost is
due to the pain, suffering, and quality of life diminution of the
victims.”349
Human rights—including civil and political rights as well as
economic, social, and cultural rights—thus pose significant
valuation problems. The market assumptions that underpin costbenefit analysis seem inapplicable to most, if not all, human
rights.350 In this respect, human rights are analogous to sacred or
“emotional goods,” which are difficult to monetize but are no less
significant.351
A related concern regarding cost-benefit analysis and VSL
calculations stems from the principles of equality and nondiscrimination that form the core of human rights law. These
principles are viewed as fundamental attributes of human rights
law and essential to the protection of human life.352 Human rights
345.
346.
347.
348.

Heinzerling, Quality Control, supra note 330, at 1466.
Heinzerling, Cost-Benefit, supra note 341.
Id.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH COMMENTS ON THE
NATIONAL STANDARDS TO PREVENT, DETECT, AND RESPOND TO PRISON RAPE 3–4
(2011).
349. Id. at 3.
350. Even the purported objectivity of numbers and mathematics has been
questioned. See DIANE M. NELSON, WHO COUNTS? THE MATHEMATICS OF DEATH AND
LIFE AFTER GENOCIDE 4 (2015) (“And even ‘Western’ number isn’t just about truth,
sober accounting, and rational cost benefit analyses . . . . Mathematics is and are
inseparable from politics.”).
351. See Melissa Luttrell, Bentham at the OMB: A Response to Professor Rowell,
64 ADMIN. L. REV. 1013, 1014, 1029 (2012). See generally Arden Rowell, Partial
Valuation in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 723 (2012) (questioning the
use of non-quantifiable values in the cost-benefit analysis of pending vehicle safety
regulations); Michael J. Sandel, Market Reasoning as Moral Reasoning, 27 J. ECON.
PERSP. 121 (2013) (arguing that the application of market values to certain spheres
of life erodes important moral and civic goods).
352. See B.G. Ramcharan, Equality and Nondiscrimination, in THE
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF HUMAN RIGHTS 246, 246–48, 253–58 (Louis Henkin ed.,
1981) [hereinafter Ramcharan, Equality]; HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, AN
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law thus requires all human beings to be treated equally.353 And
yet, cost-benefit analysis and VSL calculations do not always treat
human beings equally and without distinction.354 VSL calculations
can incorporate age-related differences so that the purported
benefits of regulations decrease as the age of the affected population
increases.355 Other differences, including income and wealth, can
also be incorporated into cost-benefit analysis.356
Even nationality can be incorporated into VSL calculations.357
For example, economists have identified a positive correlation
between per capita income levels and VSL.358 As a result, VSL
calculations can differ widely across countries.359 The implications
of these disparities are evident in studies assessing the costs of
war.360 In one study, economists used VSL calculations to measure
the mortality costs of the U.S. military intervention in Iraq.361
Table 2 lists the combat casualties for three countries that
participated in the conflict between 2003 and 2005.362

INTERNATIONAL BILL OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN 115–25 (1945).
353. See Ramcharan, Equality, supra note 352, at 246–247.
354. See Wicks, Meaning of Life, supra note 124, at 225–232; see also GILLES
CARBONNIER, HUMANITARIAN ECONOMICS: WAR, DISASTER AND THE GLOBAL AID
MARKET 105–07 (2015) (discussing VSL calculations in the context of the War on
Terror).
355. See WICKS, CONFLICTING INTERESTS, supra note 114, at 230–231.
356. See, e.g., CARBONNIER, supra note 354, at 105–107 (discussing VSL
calculations in the context of the War on Terror).
357. Id. See generally Eyal Benvenisti, Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: On
the Accountability of States to Foreign Stakeholders, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 295 (2013)
(suggesting that states have normative obligations to consider non-citizens in certain
decisions).
358. See W. Kip Viscusi & Joseph E. Aldy, The Value of a Statistical Life: A
Critical Review of Market Estimates Throughout the World, 27 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 5, 18–30 (2003).
359. Id. at 26–30.
360. See, e.g., Scott Wallsten & Katrina Kosec, The Economic Costs of the War in
Iraq 1–3 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper No. 0519, 2005) (using VSL, among other calculations, to estimate the economic cost of the
Iraq War).
361. See id. at 1–8.
362. Id. at 14, tbl.6.
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Table 2. VSL by Nationality for the Conflict in Iraq
Country

Combat
casualties

GDP (per
capita)

VSL (in
millions)

Mortality
costs (in
millions)

Denmark

2

$49,192

$7.7

$15.0

El Salvador

2

$2,410

$3.4

$7.0

Hungary

2

$10,978

$4.2

$8.0

These countries each suffered two combat casualties during
this time period.363 The gross domestic product (GDP) per capita for
each country is also listed.364 Because VSL studies have revealed a
positive correlation between GDP and VSL, each country has a
distinct VSL.365 As a result, the cost of each casualty varies with
each country.366 Those countries with a higher GDP have a higher
VSL and, therefore, higher mortality costs.367 In contrast, those
countries with a lower GDP have a lower VSL and, therefore, lower
mortality costs.368 Such disparities are simply a product of
connecting GDP and VSL.369 However, this is also consistent with
the general methodology used for calculating the VSL.370 “Simply
put, poor people have less money available to pay to lower their risk
of death. In economists’ jargon, they display a lower ‘willingness to
pay’ or a higher ‘willingness to accept risk’ than the rich.”371
The use of VSL calculations to value human life in such a
manner is controversial.372 In these studies, economists have used
VSL calculations to essentially place a dollar figure on individual

363. Id.
364. Id.
365. In this study, the United States had a VSL of $6.5 million. Other economists
studying the costs of the War in Iraq have placed the VSL between $7 and $8 million.
See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ & LINDA J. BILMES, THE THREE TRILLION DOLLAR WAR 94–
96 (2008); War at Any Cost? The Total Economic Costs of the War Beyond the Federal
Budget: Hearing Before the J. Econ. Comm., 110th Cong. 126 (2008). In contrast,
German economists used a VSL of €2.05 million to calculate the cost of German
fatalities in the Afghanistan War. Tilman Brück et al., The Economic Costs of the
German Participation in the Afghanistan War, 48 J. PEACE RES. 793, 799 (2011). Not
surprisingly, this disparity was met with great criticism. CARBONNIER, supra note
354, at 106.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 107.
372. Id. at 105–07.
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lives, thereby valuing the lives of individuals from wealthy
countries more than the lives of individuals from poor (or lesswealthy) countries.373 The implications of such variation are
profound. From a human rights perspective, this approach
undervalues the actual costs of war in conflicts involving less
developed countries.374 In addition, this approach has troubling
implications for military operations. Political leaders could use this
data to conclude that military personnel from poorer countries
should be used in combat operations because it is cost-effective.
Moreover, battlefield decisions could be influenced by the risks
associated with a particular combat operation and the nationality
of the affected military personnel. Indeed, such disparities—where
poor countries are more heavily involved in certain military
operations than wealthy countries—have already been
documented.375 Such outcomes, which treat the value of human life
differently based on nationality, raise significant concerns under
human rights law.376
A related concern involves how countries should value foreign
lives in domestic policy decisions.377 In the United States, the
373. Id.
374. Ron P. Smith, The Economic Costs of Military Conflict, 51 J. PEACE RES. 245,
252 (2014) (“Counting fatalities treats US, German and Afghan deaths as equivalent;
counting costs using VSL does not: having Afghan troops die instead of US or
German troops reduces the measured cost of the war.”); see also JOHN BROOME,
ETHICS OUT OF ECONOMICS 177–95 (1999) (outlining theoretical perspectives on the
valuation of life).
375. See Adam McCauley, Soldiers from Poor Countries Have Become the World’s
Peacekeepers, TIME (Sept. 11, 2014), http://time.com/3272718/un-undofpeacekeeping-golan-heights-terrorism/; Heather Timmons & Neha Thirani Bagri,
Poor Nations Fight, Rich Nations Pay, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2013, 8:30 AM),
https://india.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/10/poor-nations-fight-rich-nationspay/?mcubz=3&_r=1. But see Tim Worstall, Soldiers from Poor Countries Should Be
the World’s Peacekeepers, FORBES (Sept. 12, 2014, 5:47 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/timworstall/2014/09/12/soldiers-from-the-worlds-poor-countries-should-be-theworlds-peacekeepers/ (arguing that peacekeepers should come from poor countries
for reasons of comparative advantage).
376. A distinct but related consideration involves intergenerational equity: how
should cost-benefit analysis consider future generations? See generally David
Weisbach & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change and Discounting the Future, 27 YALE
L. & POL’Y REV. 433 (2009) (endorsing the principle of intergenerational neutrality
in economic estimations of climate change impacts); DISCOUNTING AND
INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY (Paul R. Portney & John P. Weyant eds., 1999)
(outlining different economic approaches to the discount rate as it applies to
intergenerational issues); Edith Brown Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations and
Sustainable Development, 8 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 19 (1992) (suggesting
intergenerational obligations are a basic principle of sustainable development).
377. See generally David A. Dana, Valuing Foreign Lives and Settlements, 1 J.
BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 1 (2010) (contending that governmental cost-benefit
analysis should include foreign life values because surveys suggest U.S. residents

60

Law & Inequality

[Vol. 36: 1

regulatory assessment process is not meant to address foreign
lives.378 According to OMB’s Circular A-4, regulatory impact
assessments “should focus on benefits and costs that accrue to
citizens and residents of the United States.”379 If a regulation will
have effects outside the United States, such “effects should be
reported separately.”380 Commentators have criticized the manner
in which the regulatory assessment process engages in the
valuation of foreign lives, describing it as both “atheoretical and
opaque.”381 Under human rights law, the failure to properly
consider the implications of domestic policy on foreign lives is
problematic.382 “Domestic policies can have many kinds of foreign
impacts; climate change, for instance, can be expected to lead to
widespread human suffering and loss of life, as well as lasting
damage to existing ecosystems. All of these types of harms are
potentially important.”383 In other words, a country’s human rights
obligations do not stop at its borders.
In sum, there are several fundamental problems with using
cost-benefit analysis and VSL calculations to make decisions that
implicate human life. The market-based assumptions that are used
for VSL calculations are contrary to the basic principles of human
rights law. Valuing human lives differently based on age, income,
wealth, or nationality is equally problematic. These normative
concerns exist even if cost-benefit analysis and VSL calculations can
overcome their methodological limitations.
c.

Challenging the Calculus of Regulation

Human rights tribunals offer a receptive forum for the
assertion of claims challenging regulatory decisions that violate the
positive obligation to protect human life.

value foreign and domestic lives roughly equally); Arden Rowell & Lesley Wexler,
Valuing Foreign Lives, 48 GA. L. REV. 499 (2014) (outlining foreign life valuation as
a distinct analytical category from domestic valuation); Jonathan S. Masur, The
Intractable Normative Complexities of Valuing Foreign Lives, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV.
SLIP OPINIONS 12 (2015) (suggesting ad hoc basis for calculating values for foreign
lives in government cost-benefit analyses); Colleen Murphy, Differentiating Moral
Duties: A Response to Valuing Foreign Lives, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. SLIP OPINIONS 5
(2015) (arguing disparate life valuations between domestic and foreign lives are
potentially justifiable because of different moral and legal duties owed by the state
to citizens and non-citizens).
378. CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 57, at 15.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Rowell & Wexler, supra note 377, at 504.
382. Id. at 501.
383. Id.
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Procedurally, there are fewer obstacles for bringing such
claims in human rights tribunals than in domestic courts.384
Evidence rules in human rights tribunals favor truth seeking and
accountability, and states cannot ignore allegations with
impunity.385 Indeed, states have an obligation to respond to claims,
and tribunals can take negative inferences when states fail to
participate in legal proceedings.386
Standing and ripeness
requirements are less restrictive, thereby allowing a larger group of
individuals to bring claims.387
Potential victims may bring
claims.388 Individuals representing the interests of affected persons
may also bring such claims.389 Thus, there are many opportunities
to challenge regulatory decisions. And, states cannot rely on the
same immunity rules that often preclude victims from seeking
redress against state actors in domestic courts.390 Sovereign
immunity, which is typically used to preclude domestic review of
human rights abuses, does not apply in proceedings before human
rights tribunals when states are sued for their own behavior.391
Substantively, human rights law is more protective of the right
to life than domestic law.392 As evidenced by their growing
384. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 284, at 161–170 (describing differences in
meeting elements of justiciability in U.S. courts for statistical versus identified lives).
385. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY 810–15 (2015) (describing evidentiary rules for member
states and their obligation to cooperate with the European Court of Human Rights);
Alvaro Paul, An Overview of the Inter-American Court’s Evaluation of Evidence, in
THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 203, at 25 (outlining
evidentiary rules in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights); PASQUALUCCI,
supra note 243, at 163–174 (noting procedural standards for preliminary objections
before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights).
386. SCHABAS, supra note 385, at 810–814; Paul, supra note 385, at 36–45.
387. SCHABAS, supra note 385, at 736–745.
388. Id. at 743; PASQUALUCCI, supra note 243, at 133–135.
389. SCHABAS, supra note 385, at 736–745; PASQUALUCCI, supra note 243, at 100–
102; BURGORGUE-LARSEN & UBEDA DE TORRES, supra note 251, at 105, 108–112;
YUTAKA ARAI ET AL., THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 51–55 (Pieter van Dijk et al. eds., 4th ed. 2006).
390. ARAI, supra note 389, at 517.
391. This limitation is evidenced by the state’s agreement to respect the
underlying treaty obligations and the state’s acquiescence to the tribunal’s
jurisdiction for violations of such obligations. See, e.g., European Convention, supra
note 119, art. 1 (declaring everyone in the jurisdictions of contracting states is
ensured the rights and freedoms in this Convention); American Convention, supra
note 117, art. 1 (declaring that states parties recognize rights and freedoms
enshrined in this Convention for all in their jurisdictions).
392. Compare Lenahan (Gonzales) v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am.
Comm’n H.R., Report No. 80/11, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.142 (2011) (acknowledging state
responsibility for failure to protect domestic violence victims from harm), with Town
of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (rejecting state responsibility for
failure to protect domestic violence victims). See generally Amy J. Sennett, Lenahan
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jurisprudence, human rights tribunals recognize the existence of
positive obligations and the need to hold states accountable for
failing to affirmatively protect the right to life. This includes risks
to life arising from natural or human causes and from public or
private action. Significantly, human rights law does not require a
risk to be fully realized or for the harm to have already occurred.
States have an obligation to protect potential victims. Accordingly,
a state’s liability for violating the right to life norm can exist even
in the absence of death. Finally, human rights tribunals offer a
wide variety of remedies for violations, allowing redress for both
pecuniary and non-pecuniary harms.393
For example, the United States is subject to the jurisdiction of
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.394 The InterAmerican Commission is an autonomous organ of the Organization
of American States (OAS) with the authority to consider individual
petitions from individuals who are claiming human rights
violations by OAS member states.395 Significantly, the Commission
is bound by the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court
regarding the positive obligation to protect human life. The United
States has already been subjected to several proceedings before the
Inter-American Commission on a variety of claims.396 Thus, the
Inter-American Commission can serve as a forum for challenging
U.S. regulatory policies that implicate the right to life. Individual
litigants could bring such claims against the United States and

(Gonzales) v. United States of America: Defining Due Diligence?, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J.
537 (2012) (exploring how differing due diligence standards led to distinct decisions
in domestic violence cases between U.S. and international courts); Ronagh J. A.
McQuigg, Domestic Violence and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights:
Jessica Lenahan (Gonzales) v. United States, 12 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 122 (2012)
(examining the influence of international case law, especially European Court of
Human Rights decisions, on the Commission’s reasoning in Lenahan).
393. See generally DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW 330–54 (3d ed. 2015) (analyzing forms of substantive redress in international
human rights law). In this respect, human rights tribunals are particularly
innovative in recognizing damages for violations. See, e.g., Loayza-Tamayo v. Peru,
Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 42, ¶¶ 147–48
(Nov. 27, 1998) (recognizing damage to a victim’s “life plan” as a new form of damage
entitling the victim to reparations).
394. See, e.g., Tercero v. United States, Case 12.994, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R.,
Report No. 79/15, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.156 (2015) (finding deficient counsel can violate
one’s rights to a fair trial and to due process of law).
395. PASQUALUCCI, supra note 243, at 2–9, 83–85.
396. See, e.g., Tercero, Case 12.994, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. (finding deficient
counsel can violate one’s rights to a fair trial and to due process of law); Andrews v.
United States, Case 11.139, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 57/96,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, Doc. 7 rev. at 570 (1997) (finding racial bias can violate one’s
rights to a fair trial and to equality before the law).
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force it to respond in an adversarial setting. Unlike domestic
proceedings, the United States would be subject to the standards of
human rights law.
The state reporting requirements of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) offer another
mechanism for alleging violations of the positive obligation to
protect life in the United States. Under the ICCPR, a state party is
required to submit periodic reports to the U.N. Human Rights
Committee for review and consideration.397 These reports describe
how the state has attempted to comply with the ICCPR’s treaty
obligations.398 As part of the review process, the Committee
examines these reports and offers its own observations about state
compliance (or non-compliance) with the treaty along with a set of
recommendations.399 Through this process, the Committee can
request information from states on the manner in which their
regulatory decisions implicate the right to life.400 Furthermore, the
Committee can express concerns and call upon states to revise their
procedures when they fail to provide sufficient protections to human
life. Significantly, members of civil society can participate in this
process. They may submit “shadow reports” to the Committee
offering their own views of a state’s compliance with the ICCPR.401
These shadow reports can play an important role in promoting
awareness of discrete issues and placing pressure on both the
Human Rights Committee and member states to take action on
these issues.402 Since states are typically required to submit new
reports every four years, the Human Rights Committee (and civil
society) have ample opportunities to review and critique state
behavior.403
The United States is subject to the reporting requirements of
the ICCPR and, therefore, it must submit periodic reports to the
397. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 40(1), Dec. 19, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171.
398. Id.
399. Id. art. 40(4).
400. Id. art. 40(1).
401. See Why Do “Shadow Reporting?”, US HUMAN RIGHTS NETWORK,
http://www.njjn.org/uploads/digital-library/resource_492.pdf (last accessed Nov. 25,
2017) [hereinafter Shadow Reporting]; 10 Steps to Writing a Shadow Report, US
HUMAN RIGHTS NETWORK, http://www.ushrnetwork.org/sites/ushrnetwork.org/
files/10_steps_to_writing_a_shadow_report_-_iccpr.pdf (last accessed Nov. 25, 2017).
402. See Shadow Reporting, supra note 401.
403. Similar reporting requirements exist in other human rights treaties,
including the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights arts. 16–23, Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
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Human Rights Committee describing its compliance with the
treaty.404 Over the years, the Human Rights Committee has
reviewed several U.S. reports.
It has issued observations
expressing concern with U.S. non-compliance and provided
recommendations to promote greater U.S. compliance with the
treaty.405 In future proceedings, the Human Rights Committee
could require the United States to describe its use of cost-benefit
analysis and VSL calculations and their implications on the right to
life. Through the submission of shadow reports, members of civil
society could also raise these issues. And, in its observations, the
Human Rights Committee could address the methodological and
normative concerns with the use of cost-benefit analysis and VSL
calculations in the United States.
Conclusion
Cost-benefit analysis and VSL calculations offer a commonly
used and yet controversial methodology for making regulatory
decisions that implicate the right to life and other human rights.
While this Article addresses the use of cost-benefit analysis and
VSL calculations in the United States, its reasoning applies to all
entities that use this methodology in their decision-making process.
Foreign governments and international organizations regularly use
cost-benefit analysis and VSL calculations to examine the benefits
of proposed projects and the proper allocation of resources.406 For
example, the World Bank has used VSL calculations to analyze
disaster reduction strategies and the economic consequences of

404. See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the Fourth
Periodic Rep. of the U.S., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/4 (2014) [hereinafter Human
Rights Comm., Concluding Observations] (analyzing the United States’ selfassessment on its human rights record); Human Rights Comm., List of Issues in
Relation to the Fourth Periodic Rep. of the U.S.: Addendum: Replies of the United
States of America to the List of Issues, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/Q/4/Add.1 (2013)
(containing the United States’ responses on its human rights issues); Human Rights
Comm., Consideration of Rep. Submitted by States Parties Under Article 30 of the
Covenant: Fourth Periodic Rep.: U.S., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/4 (2012) (presenting
the United States’ human rights self-assessment).
405. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations, supra note 404, at 2–11.
406. See generally THE GLOBALIZATION OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz eds., 2013)
(highlighting different academic and governmental cost-benefit analysis
approaches); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., MORTALITY RISK VALUATION
IN ENVIRONMENTAL, HEALTH & TRANSPORT POLICIES (2012) (cataloguing economic
survey data and resulting assessments of mortality risk); NILS AXEL BRAATHEN ET
AL., VALUING LIVES SAVED FROM ENVIRONMENTAL, TRANSPORT AND HEALTH
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health care decisions.407 The World Health Organization has used
VSL calculations to examine the financial implications of climate
change and the economic consequences of disease control.408 The
Australian government has used VSL calculations to examine a
variety of health, employment, and transportation decisions.409
Researchers have even used VSL calculations to examine the costs
of the U.S. intervention in Iraq and risk-taking behavior in Sierra
Leone.410
In a world of limited resources, states must make difficult
choices regarding the proper allocation of resources. Economic and
financial considerations have a profound impact on the decisionmaking process.411 Human rights law does not preclude states from
making these choices. Rather, it requires a more nuanced and
rigorous review of decisions that affect human life.412 Partisan
influence and bureaucratic bias must be removed from the calculus
of regulation when human life is at stake. Greater care must be
taken when monetizing human life. In the calculus of regulation,
miscalculations carry great costs. Simply stated, “[u]ndervaluing
life leads to death.”413
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While cost-benefit analysis offers a powerful methodology for
assessing the feasibility of state action, the calculus of regulation is
itself a costly endeavor. In balancing the costs and benefits of
human life, we reveal as much about ourselves as we do about those
whose lives we sacrifice.

